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SUBOPTIMAL HUMAN RIGHTS DECISION-MAKING 
RICHARD C. CHEN? 
ABSTRACT 
 The literature on human rights generally assumes that when a state fails to comply with 
human rights norms, it is because the state’s leaders rationally determined that a violation 
would maximize the state’s expected utility. Strategies for improving compliance accordingly 
focus on altering a state’s expected utility calculation either through coercion, which seeks to 
introduce external incentives that make compliance more attractive, or persuasion, which 
seeks to recalibrate a state’s underlying preferences. A wide array of social science research, 
however, has demonstrated that human beings regularly make suboptimal decisions that 
fail to maximize their expected utility. This so-called behavioral research has had a signifi-
cant impact on domestic law scholarship, but its implications for human rights, as well as 
for international law more broadly, have not yet been adequately explored.  
 This Article begins that long-overdue conversation by showing that states may in some 
instances have an interest in complying with human rights norms but fail to do so as the 
result of suboptimal decision-making by their leaders. In particular, this Article explores 
how three strands of social science research—on prospect theory, overconfidence, and emo-
tion-based decision-making—have been applied to state leaders in international relations 
scholarship and can be extended to help explain suboptimal decisions in the human rights 
context. In doing so, this Article also addresses (without attempting to conclusively resolve) 
some of the major methodological objections to such a project by collecting the most recent 
available research on the extent to which experimental findings about individuals in labora-
tories can be translated into predictions about state behavior. Two more detailed examples 
are then provided to illustrate how suboptimal decision-making may have contributed to 
human rights violations in real-world scenarios. Finally, this Article identifies several steps 
the human rights community can take, beyond coercion and persuasion, to capitalize on 
existing incentive structures and find ways to ensure that states that already have an inter-
est in complying actually do so. 
 
  INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................  646 
 I. THE EXISTING HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME ............................................................  651 
 II. SUBOPTIMAL DECISION-MAKING.......................................................................  655 
A.   Issues of Scope ...........................................................................................  655 
B.   Three Causes of Suboptimality ..................................................................  657 
1.   Prospect Theory ....................................................................................  658 
2.   Overconfidence .....................................................................................  662 
3.   Emotion-Based Decision-Making .........................................................  666 
C.   Group Dynamics ........................................................................................  668 
 III. ILLUSTRATIONS .................................................................................................  672 
 A. Abu Ghraib ................................................................................................  673 
1.   Background ..........................................................................................  673 
2.   Alternative Explanations .....................................................................  676 
3.   Causes of Suboptimality ......................................................................  679 
 B. Turkey’s Kurdish Problem .........................................................................  682 
1.   Background ..........................................................................................  682 
2.   Alternative Explanations .....................................................................  686 
3.   Causes of Suboptimality ......................................................................  690 
 IV. BROADENING STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING COMPLIANCE .................................  692 
                                                                                                                  
 ? Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; Associ-
ate Professor of Law Designate, University of Maine School of Law. For helpful comments 
and discussions, I am grateful to Ryan Goodman, Moria Paz, John Rappaport, Ganesh 
Sitaraman, Markus Wagner, Esther Yoo, and participants in the 2014 Junior International 
Law Scholars Association Annual Meeting. 
646  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:645 
 
 A. Diagnosis ...................................................................................................  693 
 B. Engagement ...............................................................................................  695 
 C. Debiasing ...................................................................................................  697 
 D. Examples of Cooperation ...........................................................................  701 
1.   International Labor Organization .......................................................  702 
2.   International Committee of the Red Cross ...........................................  704 
  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  705 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Country A has a long tradition of respecting and promoting hu-
man rights. A recent spate of terrorist attacks, however, has created 
unease among the citizenry about national security concerns. In re-
sponse to these concerns, the government enacts a series of measures 
that enhance its power to prosecute suspected terrorists and their 
allies at the expense of civil liberties. Human rights nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) and other members of the international 
community criticize these measures as an unacceptable infringement 
upon individual rights of speech and association. 
 Country B has no tradition of valuing human rights. Its current 
leaders, however, have signed and ratified a number of international 
conventions because doing so enhances the country’s reputation 
among potential trading partners and providers of aid. The ruling 
party in country B has a longstanding conflict with an ethnic minori-
ty group, which has recently escalated into violent skirmishes be-
tween rebels and state security forces. As a result, the government 
begins arresting and detaining members of the minority group with-
out evidence and authorizes its security troops to use forceful meth-
ods to quell protests. 
 With only the limited information provided above, both of these 
scenarios can be readily explained in terms of a rational actor model, 
meaning that the leaders of both A and B could have made decisions 
that maximized the expected utilities of their respective countries. 
Although the leaders of country A may have a general preference for 
respecting human rights, they could have made a rational calculation 
that security interests outweighed that preference at a particular 
moment in time. Likewise, although the leaders of country B may see 
human rights compliance as desirable from an instrumental perspec-
tive, they could have made a rational determination that the course 
of action they adopted would have more benefits in their domestic 
conflict than any accompanying costs to the country’s international 
reputation. 
 Importantly, however, both of these scenarios could also have in-
volved suboptimal decision-making, meaning that the leaders of A 
and B actually failed to maximize the expected utilities of their re-
spective countries. In the case of country A, it could be that a differ-
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ent balancing of liberty and security would have adequately protected 
civil and political rights without substantially sacrificing national 
security objectives. Likewise, in the case of country B, it could be that 
the reputational benefits to be gained from a more conciliatory ap-
proach to the domestic conflict would have outweighed the strategic 
benefits gained from a retaliatory approach. In short, for both coun-
tries compliance with human rights could have been the optimal 
course from the standpoint of maximizing utility. 
 The goal of this Article is to bring attention to the possibility of 
suboptimal decision-making in the human rights context and to begin 
a conversation about what can and should be done about it. Much of 
human rights scholarship and practice is still premised on the as-
sumption that violations result from utility-maximizing behavior. 
This limited perspective is apparent in the assumptions behind the 
two leading strategies for influencing human rights compliance: coer-
cion and persuasion.1 Both types of strategies seek to improve com-
pliance by altering a state’s expected utility calculation. Coercion 
strategies attempt to introduce additional material incentives into 
that calculation designed either to make compliance more beneficial 
or violation more costly.2 Country A could thus be coerced into com-
plying with international norms on speech and association rights if 
the new incentives meant that compliance would now yield the most 
net benefits. Persuasion strategies, on the other hand, attempt to re-
calibrate the existing components in a state’s expected utility calcula-
tion by reshaping the state’s underlying preferences to give greater 
weight to human rights concerns.3 Country B could thus be persuad-
ed to comply with international norms on arrest and detention if the 
international community could convince B’s leaders of the importance 
and validity of these norms.  
 What is overlooked by coercion and persuasion strategies is the 
possibility of improving compliance within a state’s existing incentive 
structure. It is undoubtedly true that many human rights violations 
result from utility-maximizing behavior, and for those violations the 
only options for improving compliance would be to alter the state’s 
incentives and change its underlying preferences. As I hope to 
demonstrate, however, it is likely that at least a subset of human 
                                                                                                                  
 1. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 633-38 (2004) (describing these two 
mechanisms of social influence). Goodman and Jinks describe a third mechanism of social 
influence, acculturation, by which behavioral changes are induced “through pressures to 
assimilate.” Id. at 638. For purposes of this Article, I set acculturation aside because it 
overlaps sufficiently with the other two mechanisms at least in the aspects with which the 
present discussion is concerned. 
 2. Id. at 633-34. 
 3. Id. at 635-38. 
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rights violations result from what would properly be deemed subop-
timal decision-making. That is, at least some human rights violations 
are committed because a state’s leaders fail to recognize that compli-
ance would actually be optimal in light of the state’s existing incen-
tives and preferences. And if that is correct, then other measures, 
beyond coercion and persuasion, may be needed to address such 
abuses. In short, there may be opportunities for the human rights 
community to improve compliance by ensuring that states that al-
ready have an interest in complying actually do so. 
 Social science research in disciplines like behavioral economics 
and cognitive psychology has shown that real, live human beings 
regularly fail to make decisions consistent with what a rational actor 
model would predict.4 A rational actor model assumes that individu-
als make decisions by consciously calculating the expected utility of 
competing choices and opting for the course that maximizes their 
utility. Empirical studies of people observed in both laboratory and 
real-world settings, however, suggest that individuals depart from 
this model in a number of ways. To take just one example that will be 
explored further below, people have a tendency to treat prospective 
losses and gains asymmetrically in their decision-making process. 
Although a rational actor model predicts that individuals would in-
vest equally to avoid a ten-dollar loss and to acquire a ten-dollar 
gain, in fact they tend to be more motivated by the prospect of the 
former than that of the latter.5  
 The existence of such obstacles to complete rationality is uncon-
troversial, and outside of international law this so-called behavioral 
research has had a significant influence on legal scholars already. 
Some critics may dispute the extent or prevalence of particular bias-
es,6 or contend that they are of limited value to policymaking,7 but 
the basic point that humans sometimes make suboptimal decisions is 
                                                                                                                  
 4. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sci-
ence: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
1051 (2000) (describing the social science research and various potential applications to 
legal theory). 
 5. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 6. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1570 (1998) (questioning the “empirical robustness of behavioral 
economics”). 
 7. These objections take a variety of forms. One is that the evidence is incomplete or 
otherwise inconclusive. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality 
Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 67, 73-74 (2002). Another is that the research does not provide a sufficiently systemat-
ic understanding of human behavior to guide policymaking. See id. at 71-72. A third is 
that, even assuming suboptimality could be systematically understood, there may be unin-
tended consequences of paternalistic governmental intervention. See Jonathan 
Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive 
Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1622-23 (2006). 
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now widely accepted.8 The question, then, is whether and how this 
research can inform efforts to promote human rights compliance. 
This Article aims to spark that conversation.9 
 There are reasons for caution. Apart from the objections that 
scholars have made to the broader behavioralist project, a further 
reason that this research has not yet been adapted to the human 
rights context specifically is the uncertainty regarding how individu-
al-level biases mostly observed in laboratories can be applied to ana-
lyze the real-world behavior of leaders acting on behalf of states. Re-
cent work by international relations scholars, however, has seen at 
least some progress in attempting to make that translation. Thus, 
apart from the particular insights this discussion may have for hu-
man rights policy and practice, a further contribution I hope to make 
here is to collect recent research from the international relations lit-
erature on suboptimal decision-making by state leaders and begin a 
broader conversation about its implications for international law in 
general.10 
 Part I begins by describing the existing human rights regime, in-
cluding the major strategies for improving compliance and the extent 
to which they have succeeded. Part II then explains the concept of 
suboptimal state decision-making and identifies three lines of social 
science research that I believe are most likely to have useful implica-
                                                                                                                  
 8. See Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law and Economics, Paternalism, and Consum-
er Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 470, 471-72 (2007) (“Alt-
hough some scholars have challenged this empirical literature, they have not generally 
denied the existence of cognitive biases, or the possibility that behavioral models might 
have greater predictive power than neoclassical models under some conditions.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 9. Legal scholars have applied other aspects of the behavioral literature to human 
rights concerns. Andrew Woods, for example, has explored how human rights regimes 
might be adapted to go beyond their present focus on influencing unitary actors and take 
account of new research on how broader contextual factors shape social change. See An-
drew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 51, 53 
(2010). A recent volume edited by Woods, Ryan Goodman, and Derek Jinks collects inter-
disciplinary essays by researchers in psychology, economics, and political science to consid-
er issues such as how human rights change interacts with the development of social norms 
and how the phenomenon of psychic numbing may pose an obstacle to effective interven-
tion against genocide. See Deborah A. Prentice, The Psychology of Social Norms and the 
Promotion of Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS 23, 23-46 (Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods eds., 2012); Paul Slovic 
& David Zionts, Can International Law Stop Genocide When Our Moral Intuitions Fail Us?, 
in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 100-34. 
 10. Two recent works have undertaken a similar project, though they survey interna-
tional law generally rather than focusing on human rights. See generally Anne van Aaken, 
Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 421 (2014) (applying the 
behavioral law and economics approach to questions of treaty design and international law 
compliance); Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2320375 (applying 
behavioral insights to problems in international treaty-making, the structure of interna-
tional tribunals, and target selection in armed conflict). 
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tions for human rights. The first is prospect theory, and in particular 
its prediction that human beings are more motivated to avoid losses 
than to obtain gains. The second is overconfidence, namely the phe-
nomenon that human beings make overly optimistic assessments of 
their abilities and prospects for success. And the third is the role of 
emotions in decision-making, and in particular the idea that human 
beings view situations through the lens of particular patterns that 
were formed during emotionally resonant past experiences. For each 
cause of suboptimal decision-making, I focus on how the concept has 
been applied to state leaders in international relations scholarship 
before discussing how similar patterns may illuminate decision-
making in the human rights context specifically. 
 In Part III, I discuss two examples in further depth to illustrate 
how the various forms of suboptimal decision-making discussed in 
Part II may have contributed to human rights violations by the Unit-
ed States in the events at Abu Ghraib and by Turkey in its treatment 
of its Kurdish population. Finally, Part IV proposes some ways in 
which the human rights community could make immediate gains in 
improving compliance, without having to alter a state’s incentives or 
preferences, by adopting strategies specifically designed to address 
the causes of suboptimal decision-making. 
 In highlighting the problem of suboptimal decision-making for 
human rights, this Article ultimately seeks to supplement rather 
than displace existing reform agendas. As noted above, I would not 
dispute that many human rights violations are the result of rational 
decision-making, and to prevent such violations it is essential to find 
ways to strengthen material incentives for compliance as well as to 
change the hearts and minds of state leaders who place little value 
on human rights concerns. But I believe developing strategies to 
counter suboptimal decision-making is an equally important and 
complementary task.11 It is equally important because at least some 
conceivable measures to address the causes of suboptimal decision-
making are more realistically achievable and immediately attainable. 
Coercion strategies often fail because they require substantial re-
sources and political will to succeed,12 while persuasion strategies are 
necessarily gradual and will take a significant period of time.13 While 
the efforts on those two fronts are ongoing, the human rights com-
munity could achieve some more immediate progress by targeting 
suboptimality barriers specifically. Addressing suboptimality is also 
                                                                                                                  
 11. I made two similar points in an earlier project that applied behavioral research to 
analyze corporate human rights violations. See Note, Organizational Irrationality and 
Corporate Human Rights Violations, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1934 (2009). 
 12. See Eric A. Posner, Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Reciprocity, 6 
L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 148, 157-60 (2012). 
 13. See EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY 64 (2013). 
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generally a complementary strategy because even when coercion and 
persuasion strategies have succeeded in making compliance the utili-
ty-maximizing option, the state’s leaders could still go awry and opt 
for noncompliance as the result of suboptimal decision-making. 
 In sum, suboptimal decision-making is likely to be an important 
issue for the human rights project in the short and long term, so 
while empirical work on the nature and scope of the problem re-
mains to be done, the conversation about its implications should not 
be delayed. 
I.   THE EXISTING HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 
 This Part provides a brief overview of the existing human rights 
regime. I begin by describing coercion and persuasion, the two major 
categories of strategies for improving compliance, and show how both 
are focused on altering a state’s expected utility calculation. I then 
discuss the extent to which these strategies have succeeded. The dis-
cussion in this Article applies only to the extent that states have an 
interest in complying with at least some human rights norms. Of 
course, that condition will be satisfied more often for some states 
than others, and suboptimality concerns may be of limited relevance 
to changing the practices of the most repressive regimes. As we will 
see, however, even repressive regimes may have instrumental rea-
sons to comply in some instances, and thus even their failures to 
comply could be suboptimal rather than utility-maximizing behavior. 
 Both coercion and persuasion are attempts to alter a state’s ex-
pected utility calculation and in that sense work within the rational 
actor model. The core premise of the rational actor model is that ac-
tors seek to maximize their expected utility. This means that they 
evaluate the costs and benefits of competing options and choose the 
course that will yield them the most benefit for the least cost.14 In the 
context of international relations, a rational actor model would typi-
cally apply a simplifying assumption that treats the state (or the 
state’s leaders) as a unitary actor.15 A state’s utility is a function of 
its interests and preferences, which are typically material in nature, 
such as wealth and security, but could also be moral in nature, such 
                                                                                                                  
 14. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1063. As Korobkin and Ulen explain, there are 
other variants of rationalist theory that make more or fewer foundational assumptions. See 
id. at 1060-66. I focus on what they call the expected utility variant for the sake of simplici-
ty but would note that none of the other versions of the theory would account for the subop-
timality concerns raised here. See id. at 1066-70 (explaining why the various versions of 
rationalist theory are either inadequate or implausible or both). 
 15. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 
(2005). Rationalist theorists do not deny that states are composed of diverse individuals 
with varying interests but conclude that the simplifying assumption does not sacrifice ex-
planatory power. Id. 
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as human rights. A decision is understood to be utility maximizing 
and therefore rational if it yields more expected net benefits (that is, 
expected benefits minus expected costs) in relation to the state’s in-
terests and preferences than any other option.16 
 Coercion strategies attempt to alter a state’s expected utility cal-
culation by introducing additional costs or benefits. For example, if 
country X would like to influence country Y to improve compliance 
with a particular norm, country X could threaten sanctions for con-
tinued violations or offer additional aid for demonstrated improve-
ments. NGOs may similarly try to change country Y’s behavior by 
shaming its leaders and thereby adding reputation costs to the 
equation.17 In this scenario, it is irrelevant whether country Y plac-
es any independent weight on human rights. Coercion strategies 
may succeed by incentivizing compliance from a purely instrumen-
tal perspective.18 
 Persuasion strategies, by contrast, seek to alter the underlying 
preferences of a state’s leaders. The objective is for “[p]ersuaded ac-
tors [to] ‘internalize’ new norms and rules of appropriate behavior 
and redefine their interests and identities accordingly.”19 Leaders of 
other states, as well as members of the broader human rights com-
munity, may attempt to persuade a country’s leaders that a particu-
lar norm is worthy of respect. This can involve linking that norm to 
other values the country’s leaders already hold or using information 
to attempt to debunk previously held beliefs.20 
 Coercion and persuasion can potentially work together in a com-
plementary fashion, each reinforcing the other (though this will not 
necessarily be so).21 Each also has sufficiently serious limitations that 
                                                                                                                  
 16. The focus is on expected utility, which means that outcomes have to be discounted 
based on the probability they will occur, because we are asking whether decisions were 
rational at the time they were made. Thus, a decision could be rational even if it turned 
out, after the fact, that a different one would have been utility maximizing. 
 17. Some commentators classify shaming as a persuasion strategy. See, e.g., Thomas 
Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 14 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 
1999) (“In the area of human rights, persuasion and socialization often involve processes 
such as shaming and denunciations . . . .”). I classify it as a coercion strategy here because, 
although it may also contribute to persuasion, shaming can have the effect of improving 
compliance without changing underlying preferences. 
 18. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 633-34. 
 19. Id. at 635. 
 20. See id. at 636-37 (distilling the persuasion literature into the two subcategories of 
“framing” and “cuing”). 
 21. See RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 172 (2013) (noting that the different mechanisms of 
social influence may have negative interactions if one motivation to comply “crowds out” 
another). 
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cause many observers to view the overall human rights regime with 
skepticism. With coercion, the primary challenge is that states may 
not value the rights of people in other states enough to invest sub-
stantial resources in their improvement.22 Moreover, even when a 
group of states is willing to invest resources to improve human 
rights, they face a collective action problem that may prevent them 
from successfully cooperating to do so.23 
 Persuasion strategies face a different hurdle. While there is no 
shortage of actors with an interest in and willingness to persuade, 
such advocacy rarely has an immediate impact. Even proponents of 
persuasion strategies recognize that they are designed to work over a 
long period of time through “an iterative process of discourse”24 and a 
“repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation, and internalization.”25 
Thus, even under the most favorable assumptions coercion and per-
suasion are likely to foster only limited and gradual improvements. 
 Despite the limits just described, it is important to emphasize that 
the international human rights movement has achieved meaningful 
progress. Since the modern movement began in 1948 with the adop-
tion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, nine major multi-
lateral conventions developed under the auspices of the United Na-
tions have entered into force,26 and every state in the world is a party 
to at least one.27 Of course, a state’s membership in a treaty regime 
does not necessarily mean its leaders are genuinely committed to the 
treaty’s principles. Some states may join in the hopes of improving 
their standing in the international community without any intention 
of altering their conduct.28 But the fact that those states join for more 
opportunistic reasons is at least evidence that other states do genu-
inely believe in the principles at stake and are willing to reward that 
participation. 
 Evidence also supports the conclusion that some states are in fact 
changing their practices to comply with treaty norms. In an exhaus-
tive empirical study, political scientist Beth Simmons finds correla-
                                                                                                                  
 22. See Posner, supra note 12, at 160. 
 23. See id. at 157-59.  
 24. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 25 (1995). 
 25. Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. 
L.J. 1397, 1411 (1999). 
 26. See The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bod-
ies, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2015). 
 27. Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Cynical Savings or Reasonable Reform? Reflections on a 
Single Unified UN Human Rights Treaty Body, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 173, 179 (2007). 
 28. Laurence R. Helfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
71, 119 (noting that some states may “ratify to obtain various material and nonmaterial bene-
fits (such as foreign aid or lower trade barriers) that follow from the act of ratification”). 
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tions between ratification of particular human rights conventions 
and improved practices.29 For purposes of the present discussion, it is 
irrelevant whether the treaties played a causal role. Even if Sim-
mons’ findings reflect only a correlation,30 meaning that the states 
that improved their practices were already predisposed to do so, the 
significant point is that at least some states are endeavoring to im-
prove their human rights practices without apparent material incen-
tives to do so. These are the states that have been successfully “per-
suaded” at least as to a particular set of human rights norms. 
 For those states that lack such intrinsic motivation, the remaining 
question is the extent to which material incentives exist to influence 
their conduct. At a general level, the answer is discouraging. States 
can join human rights treaties for the limited signaling value that 
entails without expecting much in the way of enforcement against 
them for failures to comply.31 Human rights violations take place rou-
tinely and in the open without triggering any meaningful response by 
other states. Despite the International Criminal Court’s call for an 
end to impunity,32 leaders of authoritarian regimes commit atrocities 
without apparent fear of retribution.  
 Notwithstanding this bleak overall picture, there is reason to 
think that material incentives exist for individual states to improve 
in particular areas. The United States, for example, has several stat-
utes that authorize sanctions against or the withholding of aid from 
countries that have engaged in a pattern of serious human rights vio-
lations.33 Both the United States and European Union have preferen-
tial trade agreements with numerous countries requiring human 
rights reforms by their trading partners, with the threat of with-
drawing economic cooperation as the penalty for noncompliance.34 
                                                                                                                  
 29. See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 20 (2009). Simmons finds, for example, that “countries that have rati-
fied the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] are in fact likely to reduce 
their interference with some civil liberties, such as free religious practice,” and that “a 
government that has committed itself to [the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women] is much more likely to improve educational opportunities for girls, 
employment opportunities for women, and reproductive health care and autonomy for 
women.” Id. 
 30. Simmons herself concludes that the treaties she studied did in fact “contribute to a 
political and social milieu in which these rights are more likely, on the whole, to be re-
spected,” but she emphasizes that her theory is “probabilistic, not deterministic.” Id. at 21. 
 31. See Helfer, supra note 28. 
 32. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 91. 
 33. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 
YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 31-48 (2001) (summarizing the statutes and describing instances in 
which they have been invoked). 
 34. See EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, FORCED TO BE GOOD: WHY TRADE AGREEMENTS 
BOOST HUMAN RIGHTS 16-17, 33 (2009). 
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Commentators have shown that these tools are not necessarily wield-
ed in a consistent, principled manner against all violators, but in-
stead are deployed when other geopolitical factors support their use.35 
But regardless of the motives of the actors applying the coercion, the 
significant point for present purposes is that there exist states in the 
world that place little independent weight on human rights but have 
instrumental reasons to comply with some norms. 
 The preceding discussion attempts to establish the modest conclu-
sion that at least some states have an interest in complying with at 
least some human rights norms. Some may have moral preferences 
for doing so, while others have only instrumental reasons. In either 
case, it should be a priority for human rights advocates to ensure 
that states that have an interest in complying actually do so. Given 
the likelihood, discussed in the next Part, that state leaders make 
suboptimal decisions in the human rights sphere as they do in other 
contexts, it follows that violations are likely occurring that are not 
utility-maximizing and could thus be prevented with tools other than 
coercion and persuasion. 
II.   SUBOPTIMAL DECISION-MAKING 
 This Part begins with a Section on some basic issues of scope. I 
then discuss three particular causes of suboptimal decision-making 
before separately addressing research on group dynamics in decision-
making processes. 
A.   Issues of Scope 
 I begin this Section by elaborating the general concept of subopti-
mality in state decision-making, before more narrowly defining the 
category of suboptimal decisions with which this Article is concerned. 
I then address how suboptimality concerns arise in the context of 
human rights decision-making in particular. 
 As far as individual actors are concerned, the basic concept of 
suboptimality is simple: a decision is suboptimal if it fails to maxim-
ize the individual’s expected utility.36 The matter becomes more com-
plicated, however, when applied to state action. A broad range of in-
dividuals, from high-level policymakers to low-level officers, have the 
capacity to act on behalf of the state. These individuals have their 
own interests that may or may not be aligned with the interests of 
the state. Thus, the most obvious form of suboptimality, which has no 
parallel in the context of individual actors, is when a single official 
acts to serve her own interests in a way that fails to maximize the 
                                                                                                                  
 35. See id. at 14-16. 
 36. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1069. 
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state’s expected utility. Similarly, because states have complex or-
ganizational structures in which authority and information are dis-
persed among a variety of actors, the combined result of a group of 
decisions could be suboptimal even when all the individual actors in-
volved made decisions that were rational within their respective 
spheres.37 
 While those concerns are undoubtedly important, and I return to 
them briefly in Part IV.A, my focus here is more limited. For purpos-
es of this Article, I define suboptimal decisions as those made by 
high-level officials that seek and fail to maximize the state’s expected 
utility. A couple of observations will help clarify this definition. First, 
the definition excludes decisions made by individual officials seeking 
to advance their own interests at the expense of the state’s. Such ac-
tions are undoubtedly commonplace, but accounting for them would 
create a degree of complexity that I could not address within the span 
of these pages. Second, the focus is on high-level officials because 
that is consistent with the international community’s typical ap-
proach, which targets state leaders with reform efforts rather than 
attempting to reach ground-level officers directly. The category of 
human rights violations committed by rogue agents is therefore set 
aside except to the extent that decisions made by state leaders actu-
ally contributed to the abuse. 
 As is evident from those two points, my definition retains some of 
the rational actor model’s foundational assumptions, namely that 
there is such a thing as state interests and that state leaders do seek 
to maximize utility in relation to them. Regarding the former prem-
ise, I do not offer here a particular model for aggregating the inter-
ests and preferences of a domestic population into a discrete and 
identifiable utility for the state as a whole. For present purposes all 
that matters is that there is some meaningful concept of state utility 
that exists apart from the narrower, self-serving interests of a specif-
ic leader or group of leaders and against which particular decisions 
can be evaluated and determined to be rational or suboptimal. Re-
garding the latter premise, this is, as noted above, a necessary sim-
plifying assumption, but it nonetheless likely describes how many 
state decisions are made. In other words, it is plausible to assume 
that a state’s leaders are at least sometimes attempting to maximize 
the expected utility of their state, and the present analysis would be 
relevant to at least that extent. 
 Turning to how suboptimality appears in the context of human 
rights decision-making, two further clarifications are in order. First, 
suboptimality concerns can arise at different stages in a course of ac-
tion. For example, state leaders in a planning stage could miscalcu-
                                                                                                                  
 37. See Note, supra note 11, at 1937-39. 
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late which of their available options would maximize their state’s 
utility. In the country B scenario laid out in the Introduction, that 
would mean failing to see that a conciliatory approach to the domes-
tic conflict would have higher net benefits than a retaliatory ap-
proach. Alternatively, state leaders may as an initial matter have 
determined that compliance is desirable, whether for instrumental or 
moral reasons, yet fail at the stage of execution to fulfill that objec-
tive. To illustrate using the country A scenario, A’s leaders could 
have made an optimal decision to protect speech and association 
rights, but then go on to make suboptimal decisions that lead to hu-
man rights violations by providing inadequate training or allocating 
insufficient resources to officers on the ground. As I will explain lat-
er, the stage at which errors arise may affect the response that hu-
man rights advocates opt to take, but the point for now is that deci-
sions at all stages may properly be deemed suboptimal.  
 Second, the universe of relevant decisions includes those that im-
plicate human rights both directly and indirectly. A direct human 
rights decision is one for which human rights concerns are the pri-
mary focus. For example, a state may confront the question whether 
to relax speech restrictions to provide greater rights to its citizens, or 
vice versa. An indirect human rights decision is one that primarily 
addresses some other strategic objective but also has human rights 
consequences. For example, a state may decide to crack down on pub-
lic unrest primarily to serve the goal of improving social stability, 
with unintended human rights violations occurring as a result. As 
with the prior point, this distinction may have implications for how 
the human rights community should respond, but for basic defini-
tional purposes it is sufficient to note that suboptimality concerns are 
potentially relevant to both types of decisions. 
B.   Three Causes of Suboptimality 
 Decisions could be suboptimal as the result of a wide range of 
causes, and all of them are at least potentially relevant to human 
rights. I focus here on three lines of research on suboptimal decision-
making, chosen in part because they have been extensively explored 
in the international relations literature and therefore can more readi-
ly be applied to human rights, and in part because they involve forces 
that seem likely to push actors toward violations rather than compli-
ance.38 In each of the Subsections below, I will introduce one line of 
research on a particular cause of suboptimality, with an emphasis on 
                                                                                                                  
 38. In principle, suboptimal decision-making could be just as, or more likely, to drive 
actors toward compliance. As elaborated below, the three causes on which I have chosen to 
focus seem likely to exacerbate the types of risk-taking and power-seeking behavior that 
often lead to human rights violations. 
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how it has been used to analyze the decision-making of state leaders 
in international relations scholarship.39 I will then discuss how that 
research can be applied to understanding the causes of human rights 
violations.40  
 As noted at the outset of this Article, one of the challenges to this 
project is that much of the research on departures from rationality 
has focused on individuals and in particular how they behave in la-
boratory experiments. The difficulty of translating that research into 
predictions about how state leaders in the real world will act likely 
explains why its impact on international law scholarship has been 
limited. While I cannot attempt to conclusively resolve this difficulty, 
I will explore the most recent efforts in the international relations 
literature to bridge this gap and thereby craft an argument for why 
the research on suboptimal decision-making at least warrants closer 
attention by international law scholars. I address one aspect of the 
objection—whether experimental findings on individuals in laborato-
ries can meaningfully predict how state leaders, who are typically 
experienced elites, will behave in the real world—within each of the 
Subsections below. I address the second aspect of the objection—
whether the fact that state leaders often make decisions in groups 
rather than as isolated individuals—in a separate Section at the end 
of this Part. 
 1.   Prospect Theory 
 Prospect theory was first introduced in 1979 by economists Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Its central tenet is that the value in-
dividuals place on an outcome varies depending on the reference 
point.41 This tendency reflects a departure from rationality because 
classical expected utility theory assumes that individuals have fixed 
preferences that would not vary based on how choices are framed.42  
                                                                                                                  
 39. I will be briefer in my summary of the basic concepts because they have been dis-
cussed at length in numerous other law review articles. For detailed overviews of the major 
findings of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology and their applications to law, see 
generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998), and Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4. 
 40. To preview the discussion below, after sketching in the main text how a particular 
cause of suboptimality could contribute to human rights violations involving certain para-
digmatic scenarios, I provide in the footnotes some examples of such violations. My purpose 
in providing these rough examples is only to show that the paradigmatic scenarios are 
grounded in real cases, and not to contend that these specific instances necessarily in-
volved suboptimal decisions. 
 41. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Refer-
ence-Dependent Model, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1039, 1039 (1991). 
 42. See ROSE MCDERMOTT, POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 69-
71 (2004).  
2015]  HUMAN RIGHTS DECISION-MAKING 659 
 
 One concrete application of prospect theory is the phenomenon 
known as loss aversion. Experimental research demonstrates that 
individuals dislike losses relative to a preexisting status quo more 
than they value identical gains.43 Because of this aversion, individu-
als may, for example, be willing to invest more to protect against a 
prospective loss than to produce the corresponding potential gain.44   
 A corollary of this finding addresses how loss aversion affects peo-
ple’s preferences for risk. Specifically, when people are operating in 
the realm or domain of gains, meaning that all outcomes are likely to 
involve some form of gain, they will proceed with particular caution 
to avoid losses. Conversely, when people are operating in the realm 
or domain of losses, meaning that all outcomes are likely to include 
some form of loss, they will engage in riskier behavior in the hopes of 
obtaining an unlikely gain.45 Put more simply, individuals are more 
likely to act cautiously if they are operating from a secure position, 
while they are more likely to take risks if they are operating from a 
desperate position.46   
 Related to loss aversion is a phenomenon known as the status quo 
bias, which describes the tendency of individuals to prefer the exist-
ing state of affairs more than expected utility theory would predict.47 
Loss aversion provides at least a partial explanation for this bias in 
suggesting that individuals will overvalue the expected losses from 
the change and undervalue the expected gains.48 As a result, they 
may fail to make changes that would maximize their utility. An addi-
tional reason posited to explain the status quo bias is regret avoid-
ance, namely that people expect to feel greater regret when they suf-
fer negative consequences from action than when they suffer equiva-
lent consequences from inaction.49 To the extent regret avoidance is 
at work, it would suggest that the status quo bias would be particu-
larly strong when the consequences of decisions are uncertain.50 
 Loss aversion is one cognitive bias to which state leaders, or at 
least experienced ones, may be less prone than the individuals who 
                                                                                                                  
 43. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 1047. 
 44. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 42, at 72. 
 45. See id. at 71-72. 
 46. Rose McDermott & Jacek Kugler, Comparing Rational Choice and Prospect Theo-
ry Analyses: The US Decision to Launch Operation ‘Desert Storm’, January 1991, J. 
STRATEGIC STUD., Sept. 2001, 49, 51. 
 47. See generally William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Deci-
sion Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (noting that experiments show individuals 
disproportionately choose the status quo).  
 48. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, 
and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 200.  
 49. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 657 (1998). 
 50. See id.; see also id. at 647-60 (discussing other explanations for the status quo bias). 
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serve as the typical subjects of experimental research. As one group 
of political scientists concludes from the experimental data, 
“[e]xperience leads to more symmetrical decisionmaking.”51 Such re-
search suggests that applications of prospect theory to international 
relations should proceed with caution, but not that they should be 
aborted entirely. Indeed, the finding that experienced elites are less 
prone to loss aversion has a useful takeaway—that the principles of 
prospect theory should be taken particularly seriously when predict-
ing the behavior of young regimes and inexperienced leaders. Since a 
significant subset of human rights violations may well be carried out 
by such actors, these principles should not be overlooked. 
 Prospect theory has been one of the most influential behavioral 
insights among those that have been applied to international rela-
tions. One basic proposition in the literature is that state leaders 
“may be more concerned to prevent a decline in their [state’s] reputa-
tion or credibility than to increase it by a comparable amount.”52 
Since imposing reputation costs and conferring reputational benefits 
are among the few effective tools that human rights advocates pos-
sess in persuading state leaders to alter their behavior, it is im-
portant to be aware that leaders are likely to have a stronger motiva-
tion to prevent losses than to achieve gains. Thus, to maximize their 
influence, human rights advocates seeking to pressure a state’s lead-
ers to take some action should attempt to identify concrete losses 
that will follow from their failure to do so.  
 Another set of propositions in the international relations litera-
ture draws on the corollary noted above regarding the effect of loss 
aversion on risk behavior. Jack Levy notes that “[a]fter suffering 
losses (in territory, reputation, domestic political support, etc.), polit-
ical leaders have a tendency not to accommodate to those losses but 
instead to take excessive risks to recover them.”53 Moreover, excessive 
risk taking does not depend on losses having actually taken place. It 
may also follow when people perceive themselves as operating with-
                                                                                                                  
 51. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes & David G. Victor, The Cognitive Revolu-
tion and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 368, 370 (2013). 
 52. Jack S. Levy, Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Pro-
spect Theory for International Conflict, 17 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 179, 187 (1996). 
 53. Jack S. Levy, Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations, 41 
INT’L STUD. Q. 87, 93 (1997). Janice Gross Stein provides one real-world illustration of this 
phenomenon. She argues that “President Sadat of Egypt . . . never ‘normalized’ for the loss 
of the Sinai to Israel in 1967,” and therefore launched a war in 1973 in an effort to recap-
ture the Sinai despite Israel’s obvious military advantages. Janice Gross Stein, Psychologi-
cal Explanations of International Decision Making and Collective Behavior, in HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 195, 199 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Sim-
mons eds., 2d ed. 2012). 
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in the realm of losses, such that they assume some form of loss is 
forthcoming.54 
 To illustrate this latter point, as well as to test their hypothesis 
that novice leaders are more prone to loss aversion than experienced 
elites, a group of political scientists examined how the George W. 
Bush Administration dealt with two distinct crises involving North 
Korea to determine whether its approach changed with the benefit of 
more experience. In 2002, evidence emerged showing that North Ko-
rea had secretly explored a uranium enrichment program in violation 
of prior treaty commitments.55 At that time, a significant proportion 
of the President’s key foreign policy advisers lacked crisis bargaining 
experience and in particular experience with North Korea.56 And be-
cause of the recent 9/11 terrorist attacks and concerns about other 
states at the time possessing weapons of mass destruction, it is likely 
that interactions with North Korea were perceived as within the 
realm of losses.57 In these circumstances, prospect theory would pre-
dict that the Bush Administration would take an overly aggressive, 
risk-embracing stance.58 In fact, the Administration did adopt a con-
frontational stance, cutting off oil shipments that were due under an 
earlier agreement.59 By contrast, four years later when the Admin-
istration had acquired more experience, its response to a similar cri-
sis in which North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon was more 
measured.60 The Bush Administration may well have still been oper-
ating in the realm of losses, but its increased level of experience ena-
bled the team “to manage risks more symmetrically.”61 
 It is important for the human rights community to understand 
what leads to excessive risk taking because many human rights vio-
lations stem from desperate conduct by state leaders. Government 
officials of a state that has suffered losses in territory to a regional 
rival may undertake a risky strategy of escalating the conflict, creat-
ing opportunities for human rights abuses by both sides.62 Leaders of 
                                                                                                                  
 54. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 51, at 374; cf. Levy, supra note 53, at 93 
(“State leaders take more risks to maintain their international positions, reputations, and 
domestic political support than they do to enhance those positions.”). 
 55. Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 51, at 375. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 376. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Border conflicts are unfortunately all too commonplace. One that is particularly 
noteworthy for the human rights concerns involved is the Bosnian War that followed the 
breakup of Yugoslavia. See Damjan Panovski, Comment, Some War Crimes Are Not Better 
Than Others: The Failure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
to Prosecute War Crimes in Macedonia, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 623, 633-35 (2004). 
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an authoritarian regime facing domestic uprisings and mounting in-
ternational pressure may take bold steps to reassert their power or 
else to establish a position of bargaining strength, resulting in high 
civilian death tolls.63 And state leaders who have recently seen lives 
lost in attacks by terrorists or rebel forces may take drastic measures 
to restore security, leading to widespread infringement upon individ-
ual liberties.64 
 In all of those scenarios, the fact that a risk was taken does not 
necessarily mean it was the result of suboptimal decision-making. 
Each of the hypothetical actions described could have served im-
portant strategic objectives of the state. The state leaders at issue 
could thus have chosen their course without having been influenced 
by loss aversion, based on a rational calculation of expected utility. In 
any event, the important takeaway for the human rights community 
is simply to recognize the possibility that loss aversion is at work be-
cause, as discussed in Part IV below, its presence or absence may af-
fect how the community chooses to respond.  
 2.   Overconfidence 
 A broad range of social science research points to the conclusion 
that human beings tend to be overconfident. Psychologists Shelley 
Taylor and Jonathon Brown have identified three primary ways in 
which people demonstrate overconfidence: “(a) They view themselves 
in unrealistically positive terms; (b) they believe they have greater 
control over environmental events than is actually the case; and 
(c) they hold views of the future that are more rosy than base-rate 
                                                                                                                  
 63. Examples of such behavior are not hard to find. Shortly before the Libyan dicta-
torship fell, commentators observed that Muammar Gaddafi was making desperation 
moves from an increasingly vulnerable position. See David Williams, Gaddafi Fires Scud 
Missile at Rebel Forces in Desperate New Tactic to Hang on to Power, DAILYMAIL.COM, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2026634/Gaddafi-fires-Scud-missile-rebel-forces-
desperate-new-tactic-hang-power.html (last updated Aug. 17, 2011, 2:08 AM). Likewise, 
the recent use of chemical weapons by Bashar al-Assad in Syria has been described as a 
desperate attack launched because the regime was feeling cornered. See Nic Robertson, 
Chemical Weapons: The Desperate Commander’s Escape from Stalemate, CNN.COM, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/07/world/syria-chemical-weapons/ (last updated Sept. 8, 2013, 
12:11 PM). Of course, some have described the deal reached in the aftermath of that attack 
as a victory for Assad, so the risk he took may well have been a rational one. See Shadi 
Hamid, The U.S.-Russian Deal on Syria: A Victory for Assad, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 14, 
2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/the-us-russian-
deal-on-syria-a-victory-for-assad/279680/. 
 64. The United States’ response to the 9/11 attacks has been criticized on these 
grounds. See, e.g., David Schultz, Democracy on Trial: Terrorism, Crime, and National 
Security Policy in a Post 9-11 World, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 195, 206-07 (2008) (citing 
criticisms of the United States for national security policies that infringed on individual 
liberties). 
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data can justify.”65 The evidence for the overconfidence bias starts with 
extensive survey data showing that a majority of respondents believe 
themselves to be better than average in some attribute or more likely 
than average to succeed in some respect.66 And experiments confirm 
that test subjects will in fact act consistently with their overconfidence, 
as when they fail in mock negotiations to properly assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of their respective positions.67 
 Overconfidence may have an evolutionary basis. Dominic Johnson, 
who is trained in both political science and evolutionary biology, ar-
gues that exaggerated confidence was an adaptive advantage in our 
evolutionary past.68 Among other advantages, overconfidence may 
have long-term benefits because “the costs of failure . . . often matter 
less than the missed opportunities arising from accuracy or overcau-
tiousness,” and because “it can increase performance in conflict” by 
“boost[ing] resolve and/or bluff[ing] the enemy into submission.”69 
Johnson explains that overconfidence in modern life is unlikely to be 
adaptive in the evolutionary sense (i.e., in promoting reproductive 
success) but probably remains an advantage in the sense that over-
confident people may in general be more likely to succeed.70 
 The flipside, of course, is that overconfidence leads to failed under-
takings that a rational actor might have chosen not to pursue.71 
Moreover, the costs of such failures may be more extreme precisely 
because the overconfident actor does not recognize pitfalls or is will-
ing to march resolutely into impending disaster.72 The negative ef-
fects of overconfidence are exacerbated by the related self-serving 
bias, which refers to “the observation that actors often interpret in-
formation in ways that serve their interests or preconceived no-
tions.”73 Thus, rather than being dissuaded from a course of action by 
new data that would give rational actors pause, overconfident actors 
may find a way to interpret that same information as confirming 
their initial belief or choice. 
 In contrast to similar studies of prospect theory, experimental re-
search provides evidence that experienced elites overestimate their 
                                                                                                                  
 65. Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Positive Illusions and Well-Being Revisit-
ed: Separating Fact from Fiction, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 21 (1994). 
 66. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1091. 
 67. See id. at 1093-94. 
 68. DOMINIC D. P. JOHNSON, OVERCONFIDENCE AND WAR 6 (2004).  
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 16-17. 
 71. Roy F. Baumeister, The Optimal Margin of Illusion, 8 J. SOC. & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 176, 177 (1989) (“[O]verestimating one’s abilities and likelihood of success can 
lead one into various undertakings that consume time and energy and produce failure.”). 
 72. See JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 16. 
 73. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1093. 
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abilities even more so than inexperienced test subjects.74 Further, 
Johnson makes a persuasive case that state leaders, as a particular 
species of experienced elites, are especially likely to be prone to over-
confidence. In describing the characteristics of leading politicians, he 
notes that “[t]he people who make it to the top of political hierarchies 
tend to be those who have especially pronounced self-esteem, confi-
dence in their ability to change things, and optimism that they can 
make a difference.”75 Moreover, to obtain their high position they 
must have “a character that can shoulder major burdens, accept nu-
merous setbacks, and withstand constant criticism, and yet still get 
up every day believing they are right.”76 Finally, having obtained 
these positions, political leaders may be further buoyed by their new-
found power and a sense that they can achieve something great.77  
 The consequences of overconfidence in international affairs are 
likely widespread and have been recognized as such. Johnson applies 
the research on overconfidence to the issue of wartime decision-
making and examines several case studies to support the general hy-
pothesis that overconfidence increases the likelihood of war. He 
demonstrates, for example, how both sides in World War I were not 
only confident in their prospects for victory, but believed that victory 
would come swiftly.78 Furthermore, he cites instances during the 
course of that war in which attacks were launched with great opti-
mism only to end in disastrous defeats.79 While the mistaken judg-
ments on both the macro and micro levels are easiest to see in hind-
sight, commentators suggest that there was adequate information 
available to make more appropriate evaluations of the risks—and 
that some actors in the war did make such assessments contempora-
neously.80 Evidence shows that overconfident beliefs were prevalent 
among political and military leaders as well as the citizens of the 
states involved.81 
 It is a small step to extrapolate from Johnson’s analysis of war 
decision-making by states and recognize how similar dynamics are 
involved in human rights decision-making. At the planning stage, 
state leaders must make the strategic calculation of whether the 
benefits of a war will outweigh its costs. If overconfidence plagues 
                                                                                                                  
 74. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 51, at 372. 
 75. JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 24. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 25-26. 
 78. Id. at 59. 
 79. Id. at 77-79.  
 80. Id. at 78-79 (citing Jack Snyder, Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offen-
sive, 1914 and 1984, in MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
20, 20-21 (Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Stephen Van Evera eds., rev. ed. 1991)). 
 81. Id. at 65-66.  
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that decision-making process, the state may enter a strategically un-
favorable war. Similar errors in calculation may result in human 
rights conduct that fails to maximize the state’s expected utility. The 
range of strategic planning decisions that could implicate human 
rights issues is quite broad. For example, a state’s leaders could spe-
cifically choose not to comply with an established human rights norm 
because they are unduly optimistic that the righteousness of their 
course of conduct will be recognized by the international communi-
ty.82 In a different vein involving human rights concerns that are pre-
sented more indirectly, state leaders may hold overconfident atti-
tudes that blind them to the fact that a given course of action is likely 
to have human rights implications at all, thus preventing them from 
making the optimal calculation based on all the relevant inputs.83   
 Parallels can also be drawn at the operational level or implementa-
tion stage. For example, military leaders at war need to make complex 
decisions about the allocation of resources. Avoidable failures can oc-
cur if the leaders are overconfident in their calculation of the resources 
needed to pursue a given strategy. Likewise, the improvement of hu-
man rights practices will often require the investment of resources, 
and state officials could be overconfident about their ability to make 
those improvements without that investment or with a less complete 
investment.84 Therefore, human rights violations may result even 
when a state’s leaders believe compliance is in the state’s interest be-
cause they fail to provide adequate training to, or resources needed by, 
ground-level officials to meet international standards.85 
 Another operational-level parallel can be drawn in the crisis deci-
sion-making that is required both during war and in the human 
rights context. Johnson observes that overconfidence is likely to in-
                                                                                                                  
 82. China’s leaders, for example, regularly justify their slow progress in implementing 
human rights by arguing that developing countries require more leeway to deal with prob-
lems of social instability, but these justifications are widely criticized. See Randall 
Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double Standard?, 38 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 71, 113-14 (2005). 
 83. Environmental regulations, such as efforts to combat climate change, have been 
scrutinized for potential unanticipated human rights consequences. See Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, “First, Do No Harm”: Human Rights and Efforts to Combat Climate Change, 38 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 593, 594-95 (2010). 
 84. To be clear, even when leaders have determined compliance to be in the state’s 
overall interest, each implementation decision requires its own expected utility calculation. 
Although I highlight the failure to provide adequate resources as a potentially suboptimal 
decision due to overconfidence, the decision could also be rational in a given instance if, for 
example, those resources were needed to serve some other important state interest, or 
simply because the benefits they would yield in terms of improved compliance do not out-
weigh the costs. 
 85. See, e.g., David Aronofsky & Matthew Cooper, The War on Terror and Interna-
tional Human Rights: Does Europe Get it Right?, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 567, 594-96 
(2009) (describing concern that U.S. immigration detention facilities do not meet interna-
tional human rights standards as a result of inadequate resources and training for staff). 
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crease during times of danger.86 In war, overconfidence during such 
moments of urgency may result not only in avoidable defeats, but 
crippling or catastrophic losses. The stakes are similar in the human 
rights context. During a crisis situation, such as widespread public 
unrest, overconfident state leaders may improperly calculate the pos-
sibility of escalation and send unprepared officers into the fray who 
then commit abuses even though compliance would have better 
served the state’s interests.87   
 As in the prospect theory Section, it is important to emphasize 
that for any given real-world scenario that follows one of the para-
digms described above, the actual state leaders involved could have 
been making entirely rational calculations. The point to see, however, 
is how overconfidence may operate in these general types of scenari-
os, because in the marginal case overconfidence could make the dif-
ference between violation and compliance. 
 3.   Emotion-Based Decision-Making 
 That emotions play some role in human decision-making is well 
understood. The difficulty lies in assessing whether that role should 
be given any attention in models of human behavior, given its un-
wieldiness. One skeptical viewpoint would suggest that emotion is 
irrational and therefore not subject to systematic explanation.88 
Without attempting to resolve those objections to the larger project of 
incorporating emotions into models of human behavior, I will draw 
on one particular strand of research that has previously been applied 
to international relations, termed “emotion-based pattern recogni-
tion” by political scientist Stephen Peter Rosen.89 
 In Rosen’s account, human beings “can and do make decisions that 
are the result of the comparison of alternative expected outcomes.”90 
This much is consistent with rational models of behavior. But when 
operating under time pressure and addressing an issue in which they 
have prior experience, people will view the situation through the lens 
of those past experiences, drawing particularly on “remembered pat-
terns [that] were formed at a time of emotional arousal through 
which the decision maker[s] lived.”91 When time permits, a more con-
scious cognitive process can use subsequently obtained data to alter 
                                                                                                                  
 86. JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 46.  
 87. The recent crisis in Ukraine, for example, has been attributed to a public backlash 
following overly severe government crackdowns on peaceful protesters. See Why Is Ukraine 
in Turmoil?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25182823. 
 88. MCDERMOTT, supra note 42, at 169. 
 89. STEPHEN PETER ROSEN, WAR AND HUMAN NATURE 29 (2005). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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the emotion-based decision, but rational analysis may also play a 
more secondary role by simply helping to select the course of action 
that will best implement the earlier decision.92 In short, while not 
rejecting the possibility and importance of rational analysis entirely, 
this account supplements the rational model by explaining how hu-
man beings find the data points they deem relevant and reach an ul-
timate conclusion when it would simply be impossible to do a full 
processing of all the available information that would potentially 
bear on the decision. 
 Compared to the previously discussed causes of suboptimality, the 
phenomenon of emotion-based decision-making has a stronger scien-
tific basis and does not depend primarily on observations of how ran-
dom individual subjects have behaved in laboratory settings. Neuro-
science research studying activity in the human brain during deci-
sion-making confirms that the cognitive processing of information 
includes an emotional component.93 Given this firmer grounding, 
there is less reason for concern that the research would not translate 
to elite state leaders operating in real-world conditions, and the in-
ternational relations literature has not shown reluctance in taking 
such a step.94 
 As Johnson did with overconfidence, Rosen applies the concept of 
emotion-based pattern recognition to decision-making in war. One 
case study used by Rosen examines the decision-making process of 
John F. Kennedy and his administration during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. While a traditional account of that episode portrays the actors 
as engaged in a “careful evaluation of alternative options, and a con-
scious search for information to illuminate those options,” one histo-
rian’s review of transcripts of meetings about the crisis emphasizes 
the striking absence of any substantive debate about the military im-
portance of Soviet missiles being present in Cuba.95 In light of that 
observation, Rosen advances the alternative explanation that Kenne-
dy’s tough-minded response was formulated on the basis of negative 
emotions, stemming from the negative reaction Kennedy had follow-
ing a Vienna summit meeting with Soviet premier Nikita Khrush-
chev, and from subsequent comments by the latter that likely left 
Kennedy feeling the need to avoid the appearance of weakness.96 
Even assuming that a rational weighing of costs and benefits would 
                                                                                                                  
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 32-35; see also Rose McDermott, The Feeling of Rationality: The Mean-
ing of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science, 2. PERSP. ON POL. 691, 692-93 (2004). 
 94. Of course, future advances could show that experienced elites are less prone to be 
influenced by emotions in their decision-making, but to my knowledge no research has 
been done to test this question. 
 95. ROSEN, supra note 89, at 59, 61. 
 96. See id. at 63. 
668  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:645 
 
have produced the same decision, the important point for present 
purposes is that Kennedy’s decision was, in fact, made quite early on, 
before there would have been time to assess the relevant data.97 
Thus, Rosen concludes that an account of the crisis that factors in 
Kennedy’s emotion-based decision-making is more persuasive.98 
 How, then, might emotion-based pattern recognition apply to hu-
man rights decision-making? Perhaps the clearest example would 
come from human rights violations that take place in the course of 
longstanding conflicts between religious or ethnic groups. In scenari-
os in which one group holds power over a religious or ethnic minority, 
for instance, the regime in power will inevitably view dealings with 
the minority group through the lens of past interactions. In particu-
lar, to the extent the minority group has created threats to the major-
ity through protests, acts of terror, or legitimate warfare, those 
traumatic moments form the emotionally resonant paradigms on 
which state leaders will later draw.99 More generally, even when a 
state does not have a troubling history with a single minority group 
in particular, its leaders may draw on conflicts with other opposition 
forces that have previously plagued the state. 
 As Rosen recognizes, emotion-based decision-making does not al-
ways produce suboptimal choices, but given the distorting effect it 
has on the available data points, it is certain to produce some.100 And 
the likelihood of suboptimal decision-making seems particularly high 
in the context of human rights. When a minority group engages in 
protests or other forms of organized activity, state leaders will gener-
ally not have a reservoir of memories involving peaceful resolutions 
on which to draw. Thus, if the patterns they do recall typically in-
volve violent uprisings that ended only with harsh crackdowns, they 
are likely to respond with excessive force or pass unduly restrictive 
policies. 
C.   Group Dynamics 
 Having summarized the research on three causes of suboptimal 
decision-making and provided an initial sketch of how they might 
affect human rights compliance, I turn to the second methodological 
concern I flagged above, namely that the behavioral research has fo-
cused on individual decision-makers and cannot readily be translated 
                                                                                                                  
 97. See id. at 62. Rosen notes that Kennedy’s first reaction to reports of missiles in 
Cuba was to say angrily, “He [Khruschev] can’t do that to me.” Id. at 63 (alteration in orig-
inal) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 98. See id. at 63-64. 
 99. Like conflicts over territory, such ethnic conflicts are all too commonplace. The 
conflict between Turkey and its Kurdish population, discussed in Part III.B, is one of many 
examples. 
 100. See ROSEN, supra note 89, at 69. 
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to state conduct. The first step in addressing this methodological con-
cern is to recognize that decisions for a state must be made by indi-
vidual officials who are at least potentially susceptible to the causes 
of suboptimality described above. As explained in Part II.A, I do con-
sider whether decisions are rational or suboptimal from the perspec-
tive of the state as a unitary entity, because a model that attempted 
to incorporate the wide range of interests held by diverse individual 
officials would be too unwieldy to produce any generalizable theory. 
But I do not mean to suggest that states are directly subject to the 
causes of suboptimality in any anthropomorphized sense. State deci-
sions are potentially suboptimal, if at all, because of errors made by 
state leaders acting on behalf of the state. 
 Even accepting this initial caveat, one could further question 
whether it makes sense to be concerned with individual biases when 
decisions on behalf of a state are often made by groups rather than 
individuals. If the group is sufficiently small, as will often be the case 
in authoritarian regimes, this concern seems less important, as there 
is less reason to think that the cognitive biases that affect individual 
decision-making will be corrected in that setting.101 Likewise, even if 
decisions by state leaders are driven by a more diffuse group, such as 
the broader domestic public, those decisions may nonetheless be 
suboptimal if they represent the aggregation of cognitive errors 
committed by that larger group of individuals. Other legal scholars 
have made similar points.102 
 Research on group dynamics lends further support to the likeli-
hood that individual cognitive biases will persist, and perhaps even 
be magnified, in a collective decision-making process. International 
relations theorists have drawn on the work of Irving Janis, the psy-
chologist who coined the term “groupthink,” to describe how in-group 
pressures drive individuals to coalesce around a group consensus 
view.103 Groups with certain levels of cohesiveness tend to produce 
suboptimal decisions because their members seek unanimity and as a 
result are unable to evaluate information and consider alternative 
                                                                                                                  
 101. See Patrick J. Keenan, Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects of Uncondi-
tioned Wealth, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 84, 124 (2009) (“When power is concentrated in the 
hands of a small number of individuals, individual psychology is important.”). 
 102. See id. (“If we assume that state behavior represents the distillation of the prefer-
ences of many constituencies, and that behavioral or decisional biases are common, then 
the actions of states may well reflect those biases. Thus, even if state behavior is guided by 
institutions, not individuals, state behavior may still be influenced by individual biases.”); 
see also Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty 
Design, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 309, 355 (2013) (noting that “even if state decision-makers have 
no cognitive biases, their decision-making may nonetheless be affected by the real or per-
ceived cognitive biases of other actors,” such as their “domestic audience”). 
 103. See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK (2d ed. 1982) (describing the dynamics 
that lead groups to suppress individual dissent and apply pressures to conform in their 
decision-making processes). 
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options as effectively as they would have on individual bases.104 
These conformist pressures also mean that dissenting views are like-
ly to be suppressed, further interfering with an effective group delib-
eration process.105 Groupthink theory thus finds that, even in the ab-
sence of cognitive biases, each individual’s decision-making process 
would be skewed. To the extent that individuals arrive with preexist-
ing biases, Janis’s research would suggest that interactions within a 
group setting likely reinforce the effect of those biases. 
 A related line of research on group polarization finds that, under 
certain conditions, a group may make more extreme decisions than 
any individual within it otherwise would have. This theory suggests 
that “members of a deliberating group predictably move toward a 
more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ prede-
liberation tendencies.”106 Like groupthink, group polarization is par-
tially explained by the absence of any effective counterarguments in 
a deliberative process.107 But whereas groupthink further relies on 
conformist tendencies as an explanation, group polarization draws on 
social comparison theory, which suggests that individuals desiring to 
preserve their self-image and reputation will shift their positions rel-
ative to that of the group.108 To illustrate the point with an example 
that would be particularly relevant to prospect theory, one key exper-
imental finding known as the “risky shift” shows that groups of indi-
viduals already predisposed to prefer a risky course will settle on a 
collective preference for even greater risk-taking.109 
 The research on both groupthink and group polarization contains 
many qualifications and does not purport to explain all collective de-
cision-making processes.110 Moreover, other theories on group deci-
sion-making provide reasons to think that groups can—again, at 
least under certain conditions—reduce the impact of individual cog-
nitive biases.111 The important point for present purposes is that 
these qualifications and opposing lines of research do not cast doubt 
                                                                                                                  
 104. Id. at 9. 
 105. See id. at 9-10. 
 106. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE 
L.J. 71, 74 (2000). 
 107. Id. at 89-90. 
 108. Id. at 88-89. 
 109. Id. at 86-87. 
 110. For summaries of the caveats recognized in each literature, see MCDERMOTT, su-
pra note 42, at 252-55, and Sunstein, supra note 106, at 90-96. 
 111. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 27-41 (2009) (ex-
plaining how groups are likely to make better decisions than individuals based on the for-
mer’s superior ability to aggregate information, evolve over time, and deliberate with the 
benefit of diverse perspectives); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmak-
ing in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12-32 (2002) (citing experimental evi-
dence suggesting that groups sometimes make better decisions than individuals). 
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on the basic proposition that some degree of suboptimal decision-
making afflicts groups. Thus, the goal for this project and others like 
it is to be aware of limitations and make more modest claims using 
the best available evidence on group decision-making in a narrowly 
specified context. With that objective in mind, I turn now to address 
the available evidence on the extent to which groups are affected by 
the particular causes of suboptimality described above. 
 First, with respect to prospect theory, empirical research on the 
behavior of firms provides reason to think that groups operating in 
the real world may be subject to loss aversion.112 In a survey of the 
empirical literature, economist Christoph Engel notes evidence that 
firms engage in more risky behavior when they are performing below 
their aspirational levels, or when their industries are performing 
poorly relative to other industries.113 In other words, they take great-
er risks when they are operating in the realm of losses. There may be 
differences between firms and states that caution against drawing 
any definitive conclusions, but it is nonetheless useful to know as a 
first step that there is evidence that groups, like individuals, may be 
prone to loss aversion.  
 Second, with regard to overconfidence, there are reasons in princi-
ple to think that overconfidence will often be exacerbated in a group 
setting. The tendencies that drive groupthink, which can result in 
the reinforcement of a variety of biases, are especially likely to exac-
erbate overconfidence. Groupthink draws on such dynamics as “a 
shared illusion of invulnerability,” “an unquestioned belief in the 
group’s inherent morality,” and the “stereotyping [of] out-groups as 
too evil for negotiation or too weak to be a threat.”114 These dynamics 
relate closely to, and are thus likely to reinforce, the forces that con-
tribute to the overconfidence of individuals. All of that said, the em-
pirical evidence on how groups and individuals compare in their sus-
ceptibility to overconfidence is more mixed and has been shown to 
depend on a variety of group characteristics.115  
 Finally, with regard to emotion-based decision-making, there is 
less research to draw on in assessing whether suboptimality at the 
individual level persists in groups. From a theoretical perspective, 
although Rosen does not tackle this question directly, the implica-
                                                                                                                  
 112. Van Aaken, supra note 10, at 444 (citing Christoph Engel, The Behaviour of Cor-
porate Actors: How Much Can We Learn from the Experimental Literature?, 6 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 445, 445 (2010)). 
 113. Engel, supra note 112, at 450. 
 114. JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 21. 
 115. See generally Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals 
and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996) (finding that the relative degree of individual 
and group bias depends on factors such as group size, the type of bias, the magnitude of 
bias, initial individual judgment, and the decision-making process). 
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tions of his argument would suggest that suboptimality is, at least in 
many cases, and with respect to state decision-making specifically, 
likely to persist. That is because the relevant patterns on which state 
leaders draw in making policy decisions may often come from experi-
ences shared by an entire generation of the state’s citizens.116 Rosen 
refers to statistical studies “confirm[ing] that negative experiences of 
the kind that could easily lead to severe negative emotional arousal 
have reliably led nations to turn against the policies that led to the 
negative emotions.”117 One example from international relations spe-
cifically is that, in deciding whether to align or stay neutral in a big 
war, small countries tended to draw more from their own experiences 
than from the general experiences of small countries making align-
ment decisions in the past.118 This finding suggests that emotions 
played some role because, while a systematic study of all similarly 
situated states would have more empirical validity, a state’s own ex-
perience would have more emotional resonance for its leaders.119 
III.   ILLUSTRATIONS 
 In this Part, I attempt to show how the various forms of subopti-
mal decision-making described above may have contributed to hu-
man rights violations in two real-world scenarios. It is difficult to 
prove definitively that a given course of conduct was suboptimal. Any 
such analysis requires making a number of assumptions about how a 
state’s leaders value particular costs and benefits, determining what 
information was available at the time of decision, and calculating 
probabilities of the range of possible outcomes. It is harder still to 
prove that any particular cause of suboptimality contributed to a giv-
en decision, absent access to the internal thoughts of the relevant 
decision-makers. 
 My more modest goal is simply to show that it is intuitively plau-
sible that the various causes of suboptimality were at work in the 
scenarios below, and if not in those, then others like them. In doing 
so, I acknowledge the possibility that the decisions involved were ac-
tually fully rational, and I do not attempt to prove that my alterna-
tive account is more persuasive. It will suffice for present purposes to 
show that suboptimal decision-making in human rights compliance is 
a realistic possibility and thus warrants greater attention.  
                                                                                                                  
 116. See ROSEN, supra note 89, at 52. 
 117. Id. at 53; see also id. at 54 (“Quantitative studies of national behavior do seem to 
support the hypothesis that massive social violence or trauma can generate shared emo-
tional experiences and memories, which can then determine state behavior.”). 
 118. Id. at 53-54. 
 119. See id. at 54. 
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A.   Abu Ghraib 
 In April 2004, CBS aired the first photographs depicting the abuse 
of Iraqi detainees by U.S. soldiers in Abu Ghraib prison on its maga-
zine show, 60 Minutes II.120 The photos were published two days later 
on the New Yorker website along with a story by Seymour Hersh.121 
News of the abuse provoked outrage among American politicians as 
well as members of the public. It likewise triggered protests and 
threats of retaliation in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East. This 
Section argues that the Abu Ghraib scandal could plausibly have 
been the result of suboptimal decision-making by the United States 
and illustrates how some of the causes of suboptimality discussed in 
the prior Part may have contributed to the events. 
 1.   Background 
 In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq, and by August 
2003 the war effort was going badly, with particular concerns about 
the absence of useful intelligence causing frustration.122 Around that 
time, President George W. Bush decided to send General Geoffrey 
Miller, the commander in charge of Guantánamo Bay, to review the 
situation in the prisons of Iraq and provide recommendations.123 The 
thrust of General Miller’s recommendation was that Iraqi prisons 
should be transformed into interrogation centers in the mold of 
Guantánamo.124   
 Within a few months, in January 2004, a major investigation into 
widespread human rights violations was launched after a military 
police officer turned over a disk containing photographs of abuse to 
Army commanders.125 The resulting report was authored by Major 
General Antonio Taguba and documented what he called “sadistic, 
blatant, and wanton criminal abuses” in the Abu Ghraib prison be-
tween October and December of 2003.126 General Taguba cited the 
following particular instances of abuse: 
Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on de-
tainees; 
Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol; 
                                                                                                                  
 120. See David Remnick, Introduction to SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: 
THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB ix, xviii (2004).  
 121. Id. 
 122. HERSH, supra note 120, at 20.  
 123. Id. at 20. 
 124. Id. at 31. 
 125. Id. at 25. 
 126. ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 
800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 16 (2004), available at https://www.aclu.org/ 
sites/default/files/torturefoia/released/TR3.pdf.  
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Pouring cold water on naked detainees; 
Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;  
Threatening male detainees with rape;  
Allowing a military police guard to stich the wound of a detainee 
who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell;  
Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom 
stick[;] 
Using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees 
with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a de-
tainee.127 
General Taguba also noted the extensive use of sexual humiliation, 
which was captured in some of the most offensive photos that were 
later published. These included “[f]orcibly arranging detainees in var-
ious sexually explicit positions for photographing,” “[f]orcing naked 
male detainees to wear women’s underwear,” and “[f]orcing groups of 
male detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed 
and videotaped.”128   
 The abuse of detainees was primarily carried out by members of 
the military police, who the report found had not received adequate 
training in the treatment of prisoners of war, including in the re-
quirements established by the Geneva Conventions.129 Most of the 
abuse described did not take place during actual interrogations; the 
officers involved instead believed they were fulfilling the request of 
military intelligence officers to “loosen” the detainees up for interro-
gations to be conducted later.130 General Taguba’s report concluded 
with a series of recommendations designed to improve the training 
and oversight of military police officers and increase the involvement 
of experts in international and operational law.131 
 A few months after the report was released internally within the 
government, the New Yorker magazine obtained a copy, and the pho-
tos were published both on the magazine’s website and in a televised 
CBS news broadcast. Condemnations from the media came swiftly.132 
Public outrage was intense and widespread.133 Military leaders past 
                                                                                                                  
 127. Id. at 17-18. 
 128. Id. at 16. 
 129. Id. at 16, 19-20. 
 130. Id. at 19. 
 131. See id. at 20-21. 
 132. See Laura Barandes, Note, A Helping Hand: Addressing New Implications of the 
Espionage Act on Freedom of the Press, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 371, 376 & n.40 (2007) (collect-
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 133. See, e.g., M. Angela Buenaventura, Torture in the Living Room, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR 
SOC. JUST. 103, 114 (2007) (describing public reaction in the United States to the Abu 
Ghraib scandal); see also David Paul Kuhn, Bush Ratings Fall Amid Iraq Woes, CBS NEWS 
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and present were among the most vocal critics of the behavior.134 
Elected officials demanded reforms and accountability.135 The con-
cern expressed among these various groups was that abusive 
treatment of detainees was inconsistent with American values as 
well as damaging to the United States’ material interests in the for-
eign policy realm. 
 The evidence that the United States suffered such material harm 
is compelling. The Abu Ghraib scandal likely undermined the legiti-
macy of the war in Iraq while helping to attract recruits to the insur-
gency.136 The events also damaged the United States’ broader inter-
ests in the Middle East by feeding into the propaganda of terrorist 
leaders and otherwise exacerbating anti-American sentiment in the 
                                                                                                                  
(May 12, 2004, 6:40 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bush-ratings-fall-amid-iraq-woes 
(citing a poll that found sixty percent of Americans believed that the abuse depicted in the 
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 134. See, e.g., Rebecca Leung, Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed, CBS NEWS (Apr. 27, 
2004), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/abuse-of-iraqi-pows-by-gis-probed/ (quoting reactions 
from former Marine Lt. Col. Bill Cowan and Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, then-deputy direc-
tor of coalition operations in Iraq); cf. HERSH, supra note 120, at 3-4 (describing the con-
cerns of General John A. Gordon, then-deputy national security adviser for combatting 
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military commanders is that abusive treatment of detainees may endanger American sol-
diers who are captured in the course of a war. See Leung, supra; see also HERSH, supra note 
120, at 71-72 (describing the concerns of Judge Advocate General officers). 
 135. See, e.g., HERSH, supra note 120, at 66-67. Hersh quotes Senator John Warner, 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee as well as a former Marine and Secretary of 
the Navy, as saying in his opening statement at the committee hearing, “There must be a 
full accounting for the cruel and disgraceful abuse of Iraqi detainees . . . . I think it is im-
portant to confront these problems swiftly, assuring that justice is done and take the cor-
rective action so that such abuses never happen again.” Id. at 67. The outrage among the 
public and elected officials probably had some concrete impact in the sense of voluntary 
changes implemented by the executive branch, see Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective 
Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 
1282-83 (2006) (describing steps taken by the Army and Pentagon to address detention 
conditions), but it did not result in accountability on the part of high-level officials or in 
lasting legislative reforms to address future concerns, see HERSH, supra note 120, at 66-70 
(describing the investigation conducted by the Senate Armed Forces Committee, which 
began aggressively but was quickly scaled back); Stuart Streichler, The War Crimes Trial 
That Never Was: An Inquiry into the War on Terrorism, the Laws of War, and Presidential 
Accountability, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 959, 974 (2011) (noting that congressional hearings were 
“toned down” after Republican colleagues threatened to strip Senator Warner of his chair-
manship of the Armed Services Committee); see also id. at 974-75 (noting that legislative 
oversight of the prosecution of the war on terror did not increase significantly even after 
Democrats took control of Congress after the 2006 election).  
 136. See Marcy Strauss, The Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269, 1303-04 (2005). 
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region.137 At the same time, the Abu Ghraib episode damaged the 
United States’ reputation among its allies, whose support the country 
needs in prosecuting the war on terror.138 As a Senate Armed Services 
Committee study of detainee treatment concluded, “The fact that 
America is seen in a negative light by so many complicates our ability 
to attract allies to our side, strengthens the hand of our enemies, and 
reduces our ability to collect intelligence that can save lives.”139 
 2.   Alternative Explanations 
 Despite the readily apparent harm caused by the Abu Ghraib epi-
sode to U.S. interests, it is possible to provide an account of the 
events that relies solely on rational decision-making. Although hu-
man rights compliance is undoubtedly one component of U.S. inter-
ests, it is not an absolute one that trumps all other objectives. Thus, 
the first point to emphasize is that even for a country that genuinely 
values human rights compliance, decisions are not necessarily subop-
timal merely because they lead to human rights violations. In any 
given decision, government leaders must balance the value of human 
rights against other interests, such as national security, and could 
make a rational determination to pursue such interests in a way that 
will result in human rights costs. Accordingly, the weighing of hu-
man rights consequences discussed below should be understood to 
include a moral as well as a material component, but the moral ele-
ment is subject to the same balancing as any other factor in the ex-
pected utility calculation. 
 Nor does the fact that the Abu Ghraib revelations provoked moral 
outrage and triggered material harms necessarily mean that the de-
cision-making of government officials was suboptimal. We must con-
sider the question from the perspective of government officials at the 
time they made the particular decisions that led to Abu Ghraib. One 
account that would not require resorting to suboptimality explana-
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tions is that the officers involved were simply rogue agents who acted 
independently, meaning that no responsibility should be attributed to 
state leaders in the first place. While that explanation is consistent 
with the Bush Administration’s view that the abuse was primarily 
the result of individual misconduct,140 most outside observers have 
attributed at least some responsibility to policies determined by ex-
ecutive branch officials.141 On this view, even if no direct orders were 
ever issued from the highest levels, senior officials established the 
conditions that made the abuse possible—first, by authorizing the 
expansion of coercive interrogations to Abu Ghraib prison, and sec-
ond, by failing to provide adequate training and resources to officers 
on the ground.142 
 Starting from that premise, we can roughly sketch an expected 
utility calculation for each of those decisions. Consider first the deci-
sion to expand coercive interrogations to Abu Ghraib. While other 
considerations could have entered the equation, the key tradeoff 
would likely have been in maximizing the national security benefits 
of obtaining useful intelligence while minimizing the human rights 
costs (again, in material and moral terms) from potential abuses. The 
determination that this balance was best achieved by expanding co-
ercive interrogations to Abu Ghraib could have been fully rational if 
some combination of the following beliefs was reasonable in light of 
the information available to the decision-makers: that authorizing 
more coercive interrogations had a high likelihood of producing ac-
tionable intelligence; that most officers in charge of interrogations 
could be trusted to stay within bounds; that even if some officers 
crossed the line into clear violations of human rights, these violations 
were unlikely to be revealed; and that if the violations were publicly 
revealed, the international response would be relatively muted.  
 There are compelling reasons, however, to question whether each 
of those beliefs was in fact reasonable. First, given the composition of 
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the prisoner population at Abu Ghraib, it is extremely unlikely that 
even effective interrogations could have produced anything of val-
ue.143 Second, based on the United States’ experience running the 
prisons at Guantánamo Bay, there were reasons to think that mili-
tary police officers could not be trusted to handle these sensitive re-
sponsibilities without running into human rights problems.144 Third, 
although there had been no prior revelations of comparably serious, 
specific abuses, the Bush Administration’s interrogation program had 
recently come under scrutiny by NGOs and the media, and at least 
the possibility of leaks should have been foreseen.145 Fourth, given 
the criticisms made by the human rights community of the Admin-
istration’s interrogation program, the international outrage should 
not have been surprising.146 If one or more of these four points is cor-
rect, then the expected net benefits of expanding the coercive interro-
gation program to Abu Ghraib may well have been low and thus like-
ly not the optimal course of action.  
 Consider next the decisions that led to the allocation of resources 
and amount of training received by officers at Abu Ghraib. The ex-
pected utility calculation here would simply require weighing the ex-
pected benefits to be gained from additional training and resources 
against the expected costs of those changes. The expected benefits 
would include improvements in human rights compliance as well as 
in the effectiveness of intelligence gathering. The expected costs 
would primarily include financial expenditures.147 The best indication 
that the Bush Administration’s decision-making on resources and 
training was suboptimal is that the recommended improvements 
identified in subsequent investigations of the Abu Ghraib episode 
were fairly basic ones that would not have required any great in-
vestment of resources.148 While there is no guarantee that these 
measures would have prevented the events at Abu Ghraib, it is none-
theless informative that the recommended solutions for a problem 
that turned out to be so costly were relatively modest in scope. Thus, 
it seems plausible to say the expected net benefits of the Administra-
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tion’s decisions in this area were low and, like the decision to expand 
coercive interrogations to Abu Ghraib, not the optimal choice. 
 3.   Causes of Suboptimality 
 Having attempted to show that Abu Ghraib was plausibly the 
product of suboptimal decision-making by the United States, I now 
turn to consider which of the various causes discussed in the prior 
Part may have contributed to those decision-making defects. 
 The first likely contributing factor is loss aversion, and specifically 
the fact that the United States was probably acting in the realm of 
losses—and thus prone to take excessive risks—when it made certain 
decisions to encourage increased reliance on coercive interrogations. 
As has been commonly observed, it is difficult to imagine a true victo-
ry in the war on terror; the best possible outcome is to avoid one at-
tack, with the knowledge that others are being plotted. The roots of 
the specific policies that permitted harsher techniques were, of 
course, the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Having failed to prevent the tragic 
losses of that day, the Bush Administration was likely in desperation 
mode for a significant period afterward.149 It is during such periods of 
desperation that prospect theory predicts actors will take unwise 
risks to avoid the apparent certainty of further losses. One such risk 
may have been the Administration’s decision to establish a special-
access program (SAP) that authorized the creation of secret interro-
gation centers and the use of harsher techniques in the aftermath of 
9/11.150 Indeed, during this time, secret memoranda were circulated 
that encouraged military leaders “to take greater risks” to change the 
course of the war on terror.151 
 It is likely that the same dynamic led to the extension of the SAP 
to Iraqi prisons. As noted above, the war effort was going poorly in 
August 2003; and, more specifically, the Bush Administration was 
concerned about failures to generate useful intelligence about the 
growing insurgency.152 In addition to extending the SAP to Abu 
Ghraib, the Administration invited General Miller, the Guantánamo 
commander, to assist in effecting a transition to a more Guantánamo-
like prison model. Given all the concerns that were already circulat-
ing about Guantánamo itself, it can probably be said, even without 
the benefit of hindsight, that this was an excessively risky ploy.153 In 
                                                                                                                  
 149. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 51, at 376. 
 150. See HERSH, supra note 120, at 16. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 20, 58-59. 
 153. One White House official who had supported reforming Guantánamo at the time 
commented after the fact, “Why do I take a failed approach at Guantánamo and move it to 
Iraq?” Id. at 20; see also id. at 3-6 (describing efforts by General Gordon to reform prison 
policies at Guantánamo). 
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short, to the extent the Abu Ghraib scandal resulted from the dubi-
ous extension of policies encouraging coercive interrogations to the 
prisons in Iraq, that decision can plausibly be explained as an exces-
sive risk taken during a time when the Bush Administration was op-
erating in the realm of losses. 
 The second likely contributing cause of suboptimal decision-
making is emotion-based pattern recognition. One piece of evidence 
that this phenomenon was at work is the fact that U.S. officials were 
so quick to assume that the solution to the problems posed by the 
growing insurgency was to employ tactics used at Guantánamo. Put-
ting aside whether the Guantánamo model was flawed on its own 
merits, the problem is that the issues raised in each setting were dis-
tinct. As General Taguba’s report appropriately recognized, the use of 
procedures developed for Guantánamo was questionable because “the 
intelligence value of detainees held at . . . Guantanamo . . . is differ-
ent than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib.”154 The 
latter population included a significant number of common criminals 
who were not suspected of terrorist ties.155 That General Taguba 
spotted this disconnect before the scandal broke suggests that a more 
objective analysis of the relevant information could have produced 
that same conclusion before General Miller’s recommendations were 
adopted in late 2003. And during this same timeframe, the prison 
was failing to address an issue that actually needed attention, name-
ly the creation of a system for processing detainees.156 Such reforms 
were important not only to respect the rights of detainees, many of 
whom had been arrested on dubious grounds,157 but also because they 
would likely have made the collection of intelligence more efficient by 
focusing interrogators on the correct targets. 
 Despite these facially apparent differences, General Miller, upon 
his arrival at Abu Ghraib, made clear that he intended to “Gitmo-ize” 
the prison.158 In this vein, he is reported to have told the commanding 
general at the time that prisoners should be treated “like dogs . . . . If 
they ever get the idea that they’re anything more than dogs, you’ve 
lost control of your interrogation.”159 Such statements reveal that 
General Miller was likely unable to see the situation he had been 
brought in to review through anything other than the past lens he 
had developed as commander in charge of Guantánamo.  
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 The third likely contributing cause of suboptimal decision-
making is overconfidence.160 While the prior two factors help explain 
how the Administration came to expand coercive interrogation poli-
cies into Abu Ghraib, the factor of overconfidence helps explain how 
failures in the implementation of that strategic decision contributed 
to the abuses that took place. Simply put, once the decision was 
made to expand the interrogation mission of Abu Ghraib prison, the 
Administration probably underestimated the resources that were 
required to gather intelligence in a manner consistent with human 
rights norms.  
 The first mistake was to place General Janis Karpinski, a com-
mander who “had never run a prison system . . . [and] had no train-
ing in handling prisoners,” in charge of Abu Ghraib.161 She was 
named commander in June 2003, was tasked with implementing the 
changes recommended by General Miller beginning in August 2003, 
and was relieved of her post in January 2004 after the concerns of 
abuse had been discovered internally.162 All the investigations of the 
Abu Ghraib episode recognized that leadership failure was one major 
cause of the misconduct.163 Given her transparent lack of qualifica-
tions for this position, it seems likely that Administration officials 
acted with overconfidence in placing and then leaving her in charge 
of this sensitive mission.164 
 Administration officials may have similarly failed to appreciate 
the training, supervision, and guidelines that were required to im-
plement the policies they had adopted. After the SAP was expanded 
into Iraq, the Administration believed it was beginning to obtain val-
uable intelligence. But it then likely erred in attempting to speed up 
its work by employing military police officers who were not trained in 
intelligence gathering to assist in the process.165 One former intelli-
gence official observed that hubris likely led Pentagon officials to cir-
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cumvent the military planners who would have properly identified 
the risks involved and recommended better controls.166 Ultimately, it 
is telling that insiders at the time believed the Administration was 
making poor implementation decisions, such as when the CIA decid-
ed to end its participation in Abu Ghraib interrogations.167 
 In sum, once the decision to employ enhanced interrogation at 
Abu Ghraib was made, the conditions were such that the likelihood of 
abuses might have been high already. But however suboptimal that 
first decision was, the failure to implement it with adequate re-
sources as a result of overconfidence likely compounded the problem. 
B.   Turkey’s Kurdish Problem 
 Since 2004, Turkey has been a formal candidate for accession to 
the European Union (EU). The official opening of this process was 
seen as a landmark moment for Turkey, which had long sought EU 
membership as a marker of acceptance among Western states. The 
primary obstacle to Turkey’s accession is Turkey’s human rights rec-
ord, and foremost among the concerns of the EU members has been 
Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish population. This Section contends 
that at least some of the human rights violations Turkey has commit-
ted against its Kurdish population could plausibly have resulted from 
suboptimal decision-making and, as in the previous Section, attempts 
to illustrate how the causes of suboptimality discussed in the prior 
Part may have contributed to those violations. 
 1.   Background 
 The Kurds are an ethnic group consisting largely of Sunni Mus-
lims who live predominantly in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.168 In 
Turkey, their population has been estimated at around fifteen million 
and is concentrated in the southeast region where they constitute a 
majority of the population in several provinces.169 Prior to World War 
I, the Kurds lived with relative autonomy under the Ottoman Em-
pire, but the end of the war and the division of the Empire split the 
area occupied by the Kurds among the four states just noted.170 The 
Treaty of Sèvres, signed in 1920 to end the war between the Allied 
powers and Ottoman Empire, had contemplated independence for the 
Kurds as well as various other minority groups that lived under Ot-
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toman rule.171 The terms of that treaty were quickly abandoned, how-
ever, as Turkish revolutionaries led by Mustapha Kemal Atatürk 
waged a war of independence that ended in a superseding Treaty of 
Lausanne, signed in 1923.172 That treaty established most of the 
modern-day borders for the Republic of Turkey and provided neither 
for Kurdish independence nor for any protections for the Kurds as a 
minority group.173 
 Atatürk went on to become Turkey’s first president and helped 
pass the new Turkish Constitution in 1924.174 Atatürk’s vision, em-
bodied in that document, was for Turkey to become “a unified, cen-
tralized and ethnically homogeneous state with a single Turkish 
identity.”175 To achieve this objective, Turkey would have to force the 
assimilation of minority groups like the Kurds, and it proceeded to do 
just that. From the very beginning of Turkey’s existence, the gov-
ernment sought to eliminate non-Turkish identities, which in the 
southeast region dominated by Kurds meant deploying a combination 
of “restrictive legislation and state-sponsored violence.”176 The Kurds 
attempted several uprisings in the 1920s and 1930s, which were met 
with brutal retaliations.177 
 Such repressive measures continued in the decades following, 
leading to the creation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in 
1978.178 The PKK launched a full-scale insurgency in 1984, lasting 
until 1999, when the PKK’s leader Abdullah Ӧcalan was captured 
and the PKK declared a ceasefire.179 Between 1984 and 1999, more 
than 37,000 people died, around 3500 villages were evacuated, and 
nearly three million people were internally displaced.180 One author 
describes the atmosphere during this period as follows: 
State security forces targeted both the PKK and Kurdish rural 
communities, and security operations in Kurdish villages were ac-
companied by arbitrary arrests, looting of moveable property, beat-
ings, torture and ‘disappearances’. Few Kurds escaped the trauma 
of the actions of state security forces. In detention, Kurds were fre-
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quently subject to ill-treatment, torture and extra-judicial execu-
tion, including falaka (beating the soles of the feet), electric shock 
treatment and rape. This was facilitated by the relative ease with 
which public authorities could subject Kurds to prolonged, incom-
municado detention and a climate of impunity among the police 
and gendarmerie in which convictions for such acts were rare and 
sentences light.181 
During this time period, freedom of expression was significantly re-
stricted as the government continued its efforts to eradicate Kurdish 
culture by, for example, banning Kurdish folk songs, Kurdish names, 
and even use of the term “Kurdish.”182 Likewise, political parties that 
put the rights of Kurds on their agendas were declared illegal, and 
political leaders who supported such rights were imprisoned and in 
some instances violently attacked.183 
 Following the 1999 ceasefire, several encouraging developments 
took place. First, Ӧcalan used the stage of his trial for treason to ap-
peal for a democratic solution that would secure equal rights for 
Kurds within the existing political structure, which marked a shift 
from the PKK’s original objective of establishing an independent 
Kurdish state.184 Several prominent Turkish state officials, in turn, 
began to express support for removing impediments to free speech 
and cultural expression, emphasizing those that limited the rights of 
Kurds.185 On the international level, the EU invited Turkey to apply 
for membership, having rejected Turkey’s application two years ear-
lier because of human rights concerns.186 The ceasefire lasted for sev-
eral years, but incidents of government persecution persisted during 
that time, and no lasting solution was reached.187 
 Although the insurgency began anew in 2004, the EU nonetheless 
decided in 2004 to begin the process of formal accession negotiations 
with Turkey.188 That decision came after the EU’s executive body, the 
European Commission, issued its finding that Turkey had made ade-
quate progress in fulfilling the so-called Copenhagen Criteria to be 
eligible to begin accession negotiations.189 The Copenhagen Criteria 
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set forth the conditions for EU membership, including the following 
political elements: “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minori-
ties.”190 Commentators have expressed concerns as to whether the 
EU’s decision to begin accession negotiations was reached premature-
ly, noting that the European Commission’s assessment might have 
glossed over human rights concerns particularly regarding Kurdish 
issues.191 But even skeptics agree that the opening of accession negoti-
ations meant a potential opportunity for the EU to place more effective 
pressure on Turkey’s continuing process of reforms in this area.192 
 The hoped-for progress has been slow in forthcoming. The skepti-
cal commentators recognize that Turkey’s initial response to the 
opening of accession negotiations was to pass a broad series of legis-
lative reforms, but they question whether these enactments meaning-
fully changed the facts on the ground.193 Moreover, the process of re-
form has slowed down or seen setbacks in various respects. As noted 
above, the PKK insurgency began again in 2004, which has meant 
renewed acts of violent persecution by state officers.194 A new anti-
terrorism law adopted in 2006 has been criticized as overly broad and 
vague, creating the possibility of extreme prosecutions for expressing 
views that contradict official state ideology.195 Requests by EU offi-
cials that Turkey take the initial step of at least recognizing that the 
Kurds are a distinct group with a distinct identity have been re-
buffed.196 A 2006 Progress Report by the European Commission cited 
a continuing lack of progress in Turkey’s willingness to “start[] a dia-
logue on the situation of national minorities.”197 
 In 2009, the government announced a “Democratic Opening” that 
entailed a series of reforms designed to help improve the situation of 
Kurds as well as other proposals to bring about peace.198 The result-
ing initiatives included a relaxation of restrictions on Kurdish-
                                                                                                                  
 190. Conditions for Membership, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ 
policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 19, 2014).  
 191. See YILDIZ & MULLER, supra note 168, at 39. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. at 39-40. 
 194. See Comm’n of the European Communities, Turkey 2006 Progress Report, COM 
(2006) 649 final, at 22 (Nov. 8, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Progress Report], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf.  
 195. GUNTER, supra note 178, at 98-99. 
 196. See id. at 101 (noting that the military’s highest ranking officer “refused to coun-
tenance the concept of the Kurds as a legally protected minority,” and quoting him as say-
ing, “ ‘[a]pproaches based on race are a shame in this century’ ”).  
 197. 2006 Progress Report, supra note 194, at 20.  
 198. Int’l Crisis Grp. (ICG), Turkey: Ending the PKK Insurgency, Eur. Rep. No. 213, at 
1, 6-7 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-
cyprus/turkey/213%20Turkey%20-%20Ending%20the%20PKK%20Insurgency.pdf. 
686  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:645 
 
language media and the granting of permission for the study of Kurd-
ish in public universities.199 Even as these reforms were being im-
plemented, however, the government continued to arrest Kurdish 
politicians and activists.200 In 2009 and 2010, the government con-
victed 350 children, some as young as age twelve, and sentenced 
them to serve in adult prisons for violating anti-terror laws because 
they had attended a PKK demonstration.201 The most recently pub-
lished Progress Report in 2012 noted the lack of follow-up on the 
Democratic Opening and continuing concerns about the prosecution 
of Kurdish writers on terrorism charges without “a clear distinction 
between the incitement to violence and the expression of nonviolent 
ideas.”202 
 In April 2013, a new ceasefire between the PKK and Turkish gov-
ernment was announced, with both sides declaring an end to the 
thirty-year conflict.203 The parties are now negotiating legal reforms. 
As of this writing, the talks are ongoing.204 
 2.   Alternative Explanations 
 The starting point for assessing whether Turkey’s handling of the 
Kurdish problem is rational is to identify Turkey’s actual interests in 
the situation. In contrast to the United States, there is little evidence 
to suggest that Turkey’s leaders place independent value on human 
rights compliance. Nonetheless, there are indications that these 
leaders genuinely want to improve the human rights of Kurds in par-
ticular for instrumental reasons, namely to assist in Turkey’s goal of 
achieving EU accession and to reduce the costs of the conflict in lives 
and resources. 
 Not too long ago, Turkish leaders denied that there was a “Kurd-
ish problem” at all that would require any special concern for the 
Kurds as a minority group; instead, the issue was one of economic 
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development in the southeast region.205 However, by 2005 the Turk-
ish prime minister was finally willing to acknowledge that a Kurdish 
problem existed, that the government had made “grave mistakes” in 
the past, and that the solution required “more democracy.”206 Shortly 
afterward, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the current 
ruling party that first entered power in 2002, began outreach efforts 
to Kurdish communities in the lead-up to the Democratic Opening.207 
In 2009, the Turkish president recognized that the Kurdish issue was 
not just a problem, but the primary challenge facing his government.208 
Apart from what the country stands to gain from EU accession, the 
material benefits of resolving the Kurdish issue are apparent to the 
government, as its own pamphlet on the Democratic Opening estimat-
ed that the internal conflict had cost Turkey $300 billion.209 
 That Turkey seems genuinely committed to achieving EU acces-
sion appears equally clear. This objective may be based on reasons of 
both economic gain and nationalistic pride. On the economic side, 
although trade may not increase dramatically as the result of EU ac-
cession because Turkey already has free trade agreements in place, 
commentators suggest there is potential gain to be had in the form of 
attracting more foreign direct investment.210 The more abstract bene-
fit of nationalistic pride stems from the vision of Turkey’s founder, 
Atatürk, of achieving full integration into the West.211 Since that 
time, Turkey has continued to pursue the goal of Westernization and 
has sought membership in key organizations to validate and further 
advance its progress. In the years leading up to the opening of EU 
accession negotiations, Turkey joined such other European organiza-
tions as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, Council of Europe, Western European Union, and North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization.212 Membership in the EU would be the cap-
stone of this process.213  
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 The picture just painted is not without complication. There are 
undoubtedly factions in Turkey that believe EU accession would be 
contrary to their own interests or that have a different vision for 
Turkey’s future. Public opinion polls have varied but generally show 
a majority of the population favoring EU accession.214 Moreover, it is 
possible that some of Turkey’s leaders oppose Kurdish reforms out of 
fear that their own economic or political standing will suffer as a re-
sult, or that some are simply prejudiced against the group and do not 
wish to see them succeed. While there is undoubtedly evidence that 
such countervailing forces exist, any evidence that they actually out-
weigh pro-reform forces is more difficult to find. Instead, most com-
mentators agree that Turkey’s leaders genuinely believe that solving 
the Kurdish problem is in the state’s interest but have simply been 
unsuccessful in doing so.215 If that is correct, then the existence of in-
ternal forces opposed to reform does not alter the conclusion that the 
state’s interests are best understood to include a genuine commit-
ment to resolving the Kurdish issue. 
 The calculation might have come out differently a couple of dec-
ades ago when the PKK pursued a more explicitly separatist agenda. 
Perhaps EU membership and a peaceful resolution would not have 
been worth the price of altering Turkey’s borders or sacrificing fun-
damental goals of national unity. But it is more difficult to see how 
merely granting Kurds more legitimate status in Turkish society and 
recognizing their need for certain protections as a minority group 
would outweigh the value of domestic peace and the economic and 
prestige gains that would flow from EU membership. 
 Although there is compelling evidence that solving the Kurdish 
issue is, as a general matter, in Turkey’s interest, the relevant ques-
tion for present purposes is whether particular decisions are rational 
or suboptimal. Just as human rights compliance was only one com-
ponent of the United States’ interests, so is solving the Kurdish prob-
lem only one component of Turkey’s. Any given decision could fail to 
maximize Turkey’s chances in that single regard but nonetheless be 
rational because it maximizes the state’s overall utility, which takes 
into account all of its interests.  
 Turkey’s leaders are probably making a broad range of such deci-
sions every day. I will focus on policies restricting the basic cultural 
and language rights of Kurds, as these are particularly difficult to 
explain in solely rational terms. As described above, Turkey has in 
place various policies forbidding Kurdish language instruction in 
public schools and bans on cultural expression, such as Kurdish mu-
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2015]  HUMAN RIGHTS DECISION-MAKING 689 
 
sic. The expected utility calculation for these policies would primarily 
involve balancing Turkey’s interests in ensuring the security and 
long-term viability of the state against its interests in successful 
peace negotiations and potential EU accession. At least as compared 
with other policies that more directly address security concerns aris-
ing from the Kurdish conflict, it is difficult to see how restrictions on 
cultural and language rights would yield enough benefit to be worth 
their substantial costs. 
 Even here, however, a rationalist account is possible. Turkey’s 
leaders could have rationally decided not to enact reforms in the area 
of cultural and language rights if they reasonably determined, for 
example, that concessions in this regard would likely encourage fur-
ther demands and incite greater unrest that would threaten state 
security far more than the initial measures on their own would have. 
On the other side of the equation, Turkey’s leaders could have rea-
sonably determined that reforms in this area would have only limited 
value because the Kurds are seeking a more radical change in their 
situation or status, and that EU accession at this point is unrealistic 
because of other political realities. If one or more of these premises is 
correct, then Turkey’s continued adherence to restrictions on Kurdish 
language and culture could in fact be fully rational and not the result 
of any suboptimal decision-making. 
 The assessment of neutral evaluators, however, casts significant 
doubt on at least two of these premises. A 2011 report by the Interna-
tional Crisis Group (ICG) cites a belief among Kurds that “official 
recognition of their right to their own language is the best way to end 
deeply ingrained discrimination.”216 A former Interior Minister re-
sponsible for internal security affairs agreed with this view in an in-
terview provided for the report.217 Thus, there is reason to think that 
reforms in language and cultural rights would in fact result in mean-
ingful progress toward a peaceful resolution. The ICG report goes on 
to note that steps taken thus far to provide for greater linguistic 
freedoms have not created any apparent problems for the state, and 
it points to the fact that other states have managed to recognize lan-
guage rights without triggering problems among their minority popu-
lations.218 Thus, there is likewise reason to think that reforms would 
not substantially undermine Turkey’s security interests.  
 The one premise that is more difficult to evaluate is whether re-
forms in language and cultural rights would move the needle signifi-
                                                                                                                  
 216. ICG, supra note 198, at 11. 
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cantly when it comes to EU accession. There is evidence to believe 
that some EU members would oppose Turkey’s accession regardless 
of its progress on the Kurdish issue and on human rights more gen-
erally.219 Thus, Turkey’s leaders may see little reason to move ahead 
on this one issue while other obstacles remain insurmountable. But 
the Kurdish issue is undoubtedly one obstacle to accession, even if 
not the only one, and the continued use of repressive policies sends a 
very visible signal to EU negotiators and member states that Turkey 
is not acting with any urgency.220 Turkey’s lack of progress gives 
countries that oppose its accession a powerful talking point, even if it 
is a pretextual one.   
 The bottom line, in any event, is that even if reforms in Kurdish 
language and cultural rights would have only a small impact on Tur-
key’s accession efforts, the other two factors do provide compelling 
reasons to think that Turkey’s current course is suboptimal. 
 3.   Causes of Suboptimality  
 As before, having attempted to make the case that Turkey has 
made some suboptimal decisions in its policies regarding the Kurdish 
situation, I now turn to consider which of the various causes dis-
cussed in the prior Part may have contributed to those decision-
making defects. 
 The first that stands out is a likely bias in favor of the status quo. 
As explained above, individuals are reluctant to pursue a change 
from the status quo particularly when the consequences of that 
change are uncertain. With regard to the Kurdish situation in Tur-
key, state leaders can undoubtedly be certain that the overall situa-
tion needs improvement, but they may fear any particular, concrete 
change because they cannot be certain that it will not undermine the 
government, much less that it will actually result in an improvement 
over the status quo. Thus, they drag their feet on reforms even while 
a violent conflict continues at great cost to Kurdish lives and Turkish 
prosperity. 
 A second likely contributing factor is the phenomenon of emotion-
based pattern recognition. One recurring theme among commenta-
tors is that Turkish leaders fear that recognizing the Kurds as a dis-
tinct group will ultimately lead to the disintegration of the Turkish 
state, a fear that is rooted in the history of the Ottoman Empire.221 
This means that the current leaders may be unable to avoid viewing 
the conflict as one that requires suppression, even as they may be-
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lieve on a rational level that negotiating for more equal rights will 
lead to a more stable regime. In my discussion of emotion-based pat-
tern recognition above, I noted that the relevant patterns are most 
often formed during emotionally resonant experiences through which 
individuals actually lived. In this example, Turkey’s current leaders 
would not have lived through the destruction of the Ottoman Empire 
themselves. Nonetheless, the overriding concern about preserving 
Turkey’s territorial integrity and national unity seems strong enough 
to have been passed through generations of leaders, such that mod-
ern-day officials may feel it almost as strongly as did the founders. 
 Moreover, each generation of leaders has had its own struggle 
with the Kurds to reinforce both the general lesson that national uni-
ty is of preeminent concern and that the Kurds pose the greatest 
threat to that objective. Turkey’s present leaders lived through the 
emotionally traumatic experiences of the 1984-1999 PKK conflict. 
The response that has worked to preserve Turkish unity time and 
again has been one of repression. That may explain why, even as the 
government has taken steps to promote particular reforms, it has 
undermined its own efforts by responding reflexively to certain de-
velopments with violence or heightened restrictions. 
 The third possible contributing factor to suboptimal decision-
making by Turkey’s leaders is overconfidence. The concern here 
would be that state leaders are overly optimistic in their ability to 
manage the Kurdish problem with minimal effort as well as in their 
chances of attaining EU accession without more fundamental chang-
es in this area. Public statements by state officials have sometimes 
betrayed this type of overconfidence.222  
 It is likely that actions taken by the international or European 
community have encouraged the overconfidence of Turkey’s leaders. 
For example, given concerns expressed by commentators about the 
move being premature, the opening of the EU accession process itself 
might have sent an unduly encouraging signal to Turkey that its 
progress in human rights and on the Kurdish issue specifically was 
adequate.223 The problem has continued with the inconsistent way in 
which Turkish violations have been evaluated in the European 
Commission’s annual progress reports.224 Mixed messages from the 
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international community exacerbate the problems associated with 
overconfidence because they prevent state leaders from effectively 
measuring their actual progress and instead encourage them to con-
tinue overestimating their ability to meet Turkey’s objectives. 
*   *   * 
 As I have emphasized, the two illustrations just provided are not 
meant to conclusively prove that U.S. and Turkish leaders made 
suboptimal decisions with respect to their handling of the Abu 
Ghraib and Kurdish situations respectively. My goal instead was to 
show that suboptimal decision-making could plausibly have been a 
factor. Even if both of those scenarios can be explained fully by a ra-
tional account, each presented a close question, and suboptimal deci-
sion-making could make the difference on the margins in another, 
similar scenario. Thus, the possibility of human rights violations re-
sulting from suboptimal decisions is substantial enough to warrant 
asking how human rights advocates might adapt their strategies ac-
cordingly. I turn to that question next. 
IV.   BROADENING STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING COMPLIANCE 
 As described in Part I, the promotion of human rights is often di-
vided into the two categories of coercion strategies, which seek to 
pressure state leaders into compliance, and persuasion strategies, 
which seek to convince state leaders of the intrinsic value of human 
rights. If all or nearly all human rights violations resulted from utili-
ty-maximizing decisions, then this two-pronged approach could be 
seen as comprehensive. Under that assumption, the only options for 
influencing state behavior would be to alter a state’s expected utility 
calculation either by introducing external material incentives, as co-
ercion seeks to do, or by changing a state’s underlying preferences, as 
persuasion seeks to do. But if a not insubstantial subset of violations 
follow from decisions by state leaders that fail to maximize expected 
utility, then there may be opportunities, currently being overlooked, 
for improving human rights compliance within the state’s existing 
incentive structure. A broader strategy would look for ways to help 
state leaders avoid these suboptimal decisions and thereby ensure 
they are complying when compliance is already in the state’s interest. 
 As I noted at the outset of this Article, developing a broadened 
strategy is important because measures aimed at correcting subop-
timal decision-making could yield immediate gains while efforts in 
coercion and persuasion are gradually proceeding. Moreover, the pro-
posals made here are generally consistent with, and potentially com-
plementary to, existing compliance strategies. That is because as the 
human rights community succeeds in creating greater material in-
centives to comply and convincing state leaders of the validity of 
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norms, it must also work to remove suboptimality barriers to ensure 
that state leaders actually follow what would then be the utility-
maximizing course.  
 In the following Sections, I explore three measures that could be 
used together to promote compliance that is already in a state’s in-
terest. The first of these, diagnosis, is more of a preliminary step that 
should be added to the process of human rights promotion before the 
work of influencing behavior begins. The second measure of engage-
ment is already in the toolkit of human rights advocates, but I pro-
pose ways in which it should be reshaped to account for the general 
problem of suboptimal decision-making. The third measure of debi-
asing moves from the general to the specific level to address the par-
ticular forms of suboptimality described in this Article. 
 In addition to human rights scholars, the primary audience for 
these recommendations is the practitioners who work in NGOs and 
experts who serve on monitoring bodies because they are the actors 
who already have an ongoing influence on state behavior. The cur-
rent relationship between NGOs and monitoring bodies on the one 
hand and state leaders on the other, however, may not be conducive 
to the type of cooperation needed to effectively implement the pro-
posed measures. Accordingly, in Part IV.D, I describe what these ac-
tors may be able to learn from the successful relationships built by 
the International Labor Organization (ILO), which has a monitoring 
body that oversees compliance with international labor standards, 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), an NGO-
like organization that monitors compliance with international hu-
manitarian law. 
A.   Diagnosis 
 The first step that should be added to the process of promoting 
human rights compliance is diagnosing the cause of a state’s viola-
tions. The importance of this step follows directly from the discussion 
above, but it is not otherwise one on which the human rights com-
munity has focused. It is understandable why this step has been 
overlooked, because the assumption has generally been that viola-
tions follow from utility-maximizing behavior, and the same two tools 
of coercion and persuasion would be equally applicable (if not always 
equally effective) in all instances. But this two-size-fits-all approach 
makes less sense if the types of problems described in the preceding 
Parts are also contributing to human rights violations. 
 A diagnostic process would therefore involve asking a series of 
questions along the following lines. First, is the violation at issue bet-
ter explained as utility-maximizing or suboptimal conduct? Answer-
ing this question requires examining evidence of the state’s interests 
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and preferences regarding the issues at stake in the particular viola-
tion. For example, does the state involved appear to place independ-
ent value on human rights or the particular norm at issue, such that 
a nonmaterial interest in compliance would likely enter its expected 
utility calculation? What were the apparent material benefits to be 
gained from violating and complying, respectively? If the analysis 
points clearly to the conclusion that state leaders were rationally 
pursuing state interests, then coercion and persuasion may be the 
proper tools on which to focus because effecting change will require 
altering the state’s expected utility calculation.  
 But if the analysis suggests even the possibility of suboptimal de-
cision-making, the second question should be at what stage the deci-
sion-making went wrong.225 As noted earlier, suboptimality can 
plague decisions beginning at a high-level planning stage and all the 
way through various stages of implementation. Determining when 
the overall decision-making process went awry would inform the type 
of response that would be appropriate. For one thing, the posture of 
state leaders is likely to be less cooperative if they made a conscious 
decision to ignore a particular norm than if the leaders had them-
selves determined that compliance would maximize the state’s utility 
and had made miscalculations in attempting to implement that deci-
sion. The leaders in the former scenario would naturally feel self-
righteous or defensive about their decisions, whereas the leaders in 
the latter scenario would be more likely to recognize a problem in 
need of solving. I discuss further implications of this distinction for 
possible intervention strategies in the following two Sections. 
 The final step in the diagnostic process is to determine what the 
likely causes of suboptimality were. As alluded to in Part I, one possi-
ble cause would be unsanctioned conduct by a rogue agent that is not 
fairly attributable to state leaders, and another would be self-serving 
conduct by officials at any level. A further possibility also alluded to 
earlier is one of organizational failure, in which some structural defect 
prevents individuals who are otherwise acting rationally within their 
respective spheres from reaching the optimal decision as a group. 
These concerns are not the focus of the present discussion, but a com-
prehensive diagnostic process would certainly take them into account 
because they point to different possible interventions. For present pur-
poses, the potentially relevant concern would be whether any decision-
making defects, such as the ones outlined in Part II, affected the state 
leaders involved in the violation. If so, then one or more of the various 
strategies discussed below may be appropriate. 
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 An obvious barrier to the success of a diagnostic process is the in-
formation to which the human rights community would have access. 
To some extent, publicly available evidence in the form of statements 
by state leaders and findings from state-appointed or independent 
investigators would assist in the formation of plausible hypotheses, 
along the lines of my analysis of the illustrations in Part III. But for 
more definitive conclusions, human rights advocates would likely 
need greater access to actual decision-makers, a point I address in 
Part IV.D. 
B.   Engagement 
 A general strategy for reducing suboptimal decision-making would 
involve greater engagement between state leaders and the human 
rights community. Engagement has been recognized as an important 
part of the traditional tool of persuasion but with a different empha-
sis. The literature on persuasion suggests that regular interactions 
between state leaders and members of the human rights community 
will gradually foster increasing acceptance among those leaders of 
the importance and legitimacy of human rights norms.226 By contrast, 
the focus of the present discussion is on improving compliance not 
through the alteration of normative views, but through the clearing 
away of obstacles in the decision-making process. 
 There are several ways in which engagement could help address 
the causes of suboptimality. The most obvious is in facilitating the 
exchange of information and best practices. Take the example of 
state leaders who miscalculated in making a high-level decision to 
violate a particular norm. One possible response would be simply to 
provide additional information that could convince them that compli-
ance would actually maximize the state’s utility. As noted above, 
state leaders in this scenario might be prone to adopting an adversar-
ial approach in any dialogue with members of the human rights 
community. Nonetheless, if concrete facts exist, or can be developed, 
to show that a state stands to gain more by complying than by violat-
ing a norm, then convincing the state’s leaders of what is already in 
their interest should be more achievable than persuading them to 
recalibrate their underlying preferences. 
 The primary value of this sort of information sharing is to help 
state leaders solve existing problems. But a further value of engage-
ment is that it can potentially improve future decision-making so 
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696  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:645 
 
that state leaders can more effectively address problems that have 
not yet arisen. The literature on cognitive biases finds that requiring 
a decision-maker to justify decisions to a third party tends to produce 
more rational thinking.227 If state leaders regularly engage with hu-
man rights advocates and experts about their compliance decisions, 
over time their reasoning process about such decisions should im-
prove, particularly as they anticipate having to justify such decisions 
to third-party evaluators. Thus, engagement can have value not only 
in actually changing the preferences of state leaders, and not only in 
helping leaders make utility-maximizing decisions on existing human 
rights problems, but also in counteracting the causes of suboptimality 
on a broader and more forward-looking basis. 
 While the benefits of such engagement are compelling, it is clear 
that the human rights community at present is not maximizing 
them. Consider the current reporting system in which state repre-
sentatives provide a written submission detailing their compliance 
record in regard to a particular human rights convention and appear 
before a body of human rights experts to respond to questions and 
concerns.228 Even setting aside the concerns raised by suboptimality 
specifically, the reporting process has been extensively criticized. As 
Professor Makau wa Mutua explains, “the [reporting] process is so 
routine that in recent years both sides just seem to go through the 
motions, even when the particular state in question is a serious viola-
tor.”229 Rosalyn Higgins, a former member of the Human Rights 
Committee, which monitors compliance with the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights,230 suggests that states “seem main-
ly concerned now with ‘treading water’ during the dialogue, simply 
with ‘getting through’ the two or three days of examination, so that 
these matters can be shelved again for another few years.”231 
 These assessments suggest that the unique opportunities that 
human rights monitoring bodies have to engage with state leaders 
are not being used to their full potential. Two possibilities for improv-
ing the quality of this interaction come to mind. The first is prioriti-
zation. While undertaking a comprehensive evaluation has some 
natural appeal, given constraints on time and resources, the forum 
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could be used more productively if the participants focused on areas 
in which compliance may already be in the state’s interest. Prioritiza-
tion would enable the participants to set aside issues on which the 
two sides clearly disagree, which in addition to saving time would 
also foster a more constructive exchange by avoiding a rehashing of 
positions that could trigger unnecessarily adversarial attitudes.232 A 
second step would be to place a greater emphasis on the importance 
of follow-up, even if the response is just to express disagreement with 
the monitoring body’s viewpoint.233 Even the simple act of formulat-
ing a substantive response to a raised concern may increase the debi-
asing potential of the interaction by requiring state officials to en-
gage in some degree of rational reasoning.234 By contrast, canned or 
general responses, including those that indicate a desire to comply 
with recommendations, suggest that the officials responsible did not 
give the matter serious thought. 
 A third, broader concern about the quality of engagement is the 
level of trust that exists between state leaders and the advocates and 
experts that make up the human rights community. I return to this 
issue below in describing what members of NGOs and monitoring 
bodies could learn from the examples of the ILO and ICRC. 
C.   Debiasing 
 Having considered how engagement can improve the general qual-
ity of decision-making, I turn now to more specific debiasing strate-
gies tailored to the three causes of suboptimality discussed above. 
Where possible, I will incorporate examples that draw on the illustra-
tions developed in the preceding Part.  
 First, with regard to prospect theory concerns, human rights ad-
vocates and experts could place a greater emphasis on the costs of 
human rights violations. State leaders may naturally view changes 
that promote human rights as a form of loss. From a ruling class’s 
perspective, such reforms may be perceived as making concessions to 
an opposition party or minority group or otherwise undermining the 
stability of the state. And even if these costs are outweighed by the 
benefits to be gained by prospective improvements, prospect theory 
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suggests that knowledge of such benefits may be insufficient to in-
centivize change, particularly when there is some degree of uncer-
tainty about that calculation. Turkey’s experience with the Kurdish 
problem illustrates the point: notwithstanding the evidence that 
Turkey stands to gain more than it would lose from reform, state 
leaders seem unable to overcome their bias in favor of the status quo. 
 If prospect theory is correct that actors are more motivated to act 
by the fear of losses than the desire for gains, then the appropriate 
strategy is to help state leaders better appreciate the costs of failing 
to comply—in other words, to fight losses with losses. Depending on 
the nature of the violations at issue, poor human rights performance 
may lead to costs ranging from deterring foreign investment to exac-
erbating public unrest. Because the status quo bias leads states to 
resolve uncertainty in favor of maintaining the current equilibrium, 
outside assistance is needed to highlight the very real costs of inac-
tion. Scholars, NGOs, and other members of the human rights com-
munity can conduct such studies and indeed have done so before.235 
Developing these facts and presenting them to state leaders could 
incentivize change in a way that appealing to the ideals of justice or 
pointing to the prospect of material gains would not. 
 The human rights community can also help states overcome the 
obstacles posed by the status quo bias by encouraging incremental 
reforms. The idea here would be that state leaders may be more will-
ing to enact small-scale reforms that provide for an opportunity to 
regularly reassess their effect and grow acclimated to a new status 
quo, against which subsequent further reforms can be evaluated.236 
For Turkey, this emphasis on gradual measures would stand some-
what in tension with the recommendations of other commentators 
who believe that only radical change will resolve the situation.237 
These writers are correct, to an extent: the arguably token measures 
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 237. See YILDIZ & MULLER, supra note 168, at 178-83. 
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that have been enacted thus far have hardly made a dent in the prob-
lem. But wholesale change is likely not politically feasible, even set-
ting aside the status quo bias. And the status quo bias helps us un-
derstand why seeking such wholesale change may well be counter-
productive. Instead, to address the concern that small-scale measures 
will serve as mere token gestures, the focus of negotiations should be 
on a comprehensive package accomplished through a series of man-
ageable steps, with conditions that must be fulfilled along the way 
and plenty of time for reassessment.  
 Second, with regard to overconfidence, it is important for human 
rights advocates and experts to translate strategic objectives into 
concrete action plans and ultimately into operational steps with 
benchmarks that allow for progress to be effectively measured. This 
recommendation follows from the antecedent conditions Dominic 
Johnson identifies for when overconfidence concerns are most likely 
to be present. As relevant here, he explains that overconfidence is 
likely to be more problematic (1) when the outcomes of policy choices 
are difficult to verify;238 (2) in the context of broad, strategic decision-
making rather than in the context of narrow, ground-level issues;239 
and (3) during the implementation stage rather than during the de-
liberation stage, meaning that once a general course of action has 
been decided upon, people think less realistically in figuring out how 
they will pursue that course.240   
 As discussed above, the high-level guidance and mixed messages 
provided by the European Commission to Turkey illustrate the chal-
lenge. If they are to overcome the apparent effects of overconfidence, 
Turkey’s leaders need to be provided with much more concrete rec-
ommendations about how to improve the human rights situation of 
Kurds and, importantly, what benchmarks would constitute ade-
quate progress for the state to remain on track for EU accession. 
Meanwhile, the experts who oversee compliance with human rights 
conventions are already taking this approach to some extent; the rec-
ommendations provided in the “concluding observations” that wrap 
up a reporting cycle are in some instances fairly targeted, including 
suggestions for specific legislation. For example, in the concluding 
observations of the Committee Against Torture in 2006, the first re-
porting date after the revelations of abuse at Abu Ghraib, the rec-
ommendations included the enactment of “a federal crime of torture, 
consistent with article 1 of the Convention,” the proper registration of 
all persons detained in any territory under the country’s jurisdiction, 
                                                                                                                  
 238. See JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 40. 
 239. See id. at 41.  
 240. See id. at 44-45.  
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and the end to the practice of detaining prisoners in “any secret de-
tention facility under [the country’s] de facto effective control.”241 
 But given that, for many areas of human rights, there is a well-
documented gap between laws on the books and facts on the ground, it 
is questionable whether recommendations for specific legislation will 
be effective in most instances. The discussion of proposals for reform 
may need to get still more granular. NGOs and monitoring bodies 
could collect and provide best practices that have been developed by 
other states facing similar issues. States in turn could be asked to 
share plans for solving particular challenges complete with break-
downs of required resources and intermediate deliverables to measure 
progress.242 The opportunity to receive third-party evaluations of such 
plans, combined with the feedback provided by concrete progress 
measures, may reduce the distorting effects of overconfidence.  
 Third, with regard to suboptimal emotion-based decisions, this 
same shift toward greater emphasis on advance planning over re-
viewing past performance may also be beneficial. Here, again, it is 
useful to recognize the circumstances in which emotion-based deci-
sion-making is most likely to short-circuit more rational analysis. 
Rosen identifies three such circumstances. First, the time available 
in which to make the decision will be short; second, the decision will 
be one that triggers an emotional response; and third, there will be a 
straightforward connection between the earlier event and the present 
decision.243 In short, emotion-based decisions take place fast and in-
stinctively. Given that the impact of emotions on decision-making is 
greatest when time is short, and there will be little if any time to in-
tervene just before a particular compliance decision is made, consult-
ing NGOs and monitoring bodies should devote time to identifying 
potential crises and assisting state leaders with the preparation of an 
action plan to minimize human rights consequences while there is 
opportunity for more rational deliberation. Although the details of a 
future crisis will not yet be discernible, its general contours can usu-
ally be predicted based on past events, and the human rights com-
munity can help devise plans of action using objective data points 
that might go overlooked during the heat of a conflict. Preparing such 
plans while there is time for rational analysis should at least temper 
                                                                                                                  
 241. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Commit-
tee Against Torture: United States of America, 36th Session, May 1–May 19, 2006, ¶¶ 13, 
16, 17, U.N. DOC. 2006CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 18, 2006), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/133838.pdf. 
 242. Of course, no state is likely to share such information when it comes to issues 
relating to national security, but for other human rights concerns that do not touch on 
matters quite as sensitive—for example, prison overcrowding or speedy trial concerns—it is 
conceivable that states will be sufficiently forthcoming. 
 243. ROSEN, supra note 89, at 55. 
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the role that emotions play in decisions made during a subsequent 
crisis.  
 A further step that NGOs and monitoring bodies could take would 
be to do more to identify and address the emotion-based patterns 
that may underlie human rights misconduct. Recognizing that hu-
man rights decisions will never be entirely free of emotions, advo-
cates and experts can attempt to counter the problematic effect pro-
duced by the default patterns by offering alternative scripts. Leaders 
should be reminded of crackdowns that escalated rather than ended a 
conflict and of force deployments that resulted in tragic losses beyond 
what anyone would have deemed acceptable. Because these alterna-
tive patterns would be presented in an artificial setting, they would 
not have the same resonance as emotionally fraught moments 
through which a state’s leaders actually lived. Nonetheless, there is 
reason to believe they can provide at least a partially countervailing 
force against the patterns on which the leaders would otherwise in-
stinctively draw, if only because they should raise doubts in the lead-
ers’ minds about the validity of their instinctive impressions.  
 In short, this approach would go beyond identifying steps that 
should be taken to helping state leaders understand why their cur-
rent approach is flawed. With the example of language and cultural 
rights for Turkish Kurds, for instance, it is not enough to tell Turkey 
where and how it needs to improve, as the Human Rights Committee 
has done already.244 There must be a dialogue about how the state’s 
past conflicts with the Kurds have colored the issue, as well as efforts 
to increase awareness of other possible patterns so that Turkey’s 
leaders may see the problem more clearly and not through the lens of 
those past conflicts.  
D.   Examples of Cooperation 
 Some of the proposals detailed above may be difficult to imagine 
as realistic in the context of NGOs and monitoring bodies as they are 
presently constituted. In particular, as alluded to above, the type of 
dialogue and interaction described in the preceding Sections would 
likely require a degree of trust between state leaders and members of 
the human rights community that does not currently exist. One rea-
son that state leaders are instinctively adversarial rather than coop-
erative when dealing with the human rights community is that 
                                                                                                                  
 244. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of 
Turkey Adopted by the Committee at Its 106th Session, Oct. 15–Nov. 2, 2012, ¶ 9, U.N. 
DOC. CCPR/C/TUR/CO/1 (2012), available at http://www.ccprcentre.org/doc/2012/ 
10/G1247598.pdf (“The State party should ensure that all persons belonging to ethnic, reli-
gious or linguistic minorities are effectively protected against any form of discrimination, 
and can fully enjoy their rights. To this regard, the State party should consider withdraw-
ing its reservation with respect to article 27 of the Covenant.”). 
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members of the latter group rely heavily on the practice of naming 
and shaming.245 Given how rare it is for more concrete sanctions to be 
imposed on human rights violators, it is understandable that NGOs 
and monitoring bodies resort to publicizing and criticizing violations 
so that at least a reputational sanction can be imposed on noncom-
pliant states. While this can be an effective means of coercion, the 
result is that few NGOs and no monitoring bodies likely have the sort 
of cooperative relationship needed to implement the recommenda-
tions made above.246   
 But by looking just beyond the core domain of human rights to 
areas like international labor rights and international humanitarian 
law, we can find two examples of organizations that have the types of 
relationships with state officials that would permit robust engage-
ment and debiasing. I consider each of these organizations in turn, 
highlighting the features that could be useful in informing how moni-
toring bodies and NGOs could build the types of trusting relation-
ships that would strengthen their ability to influence state leaders. 
 1.   International Labor Organization 
 The ILO is a United Nations agency “devoted to promoting social 
justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights.”247 
Like the monitoring bodies established by various human rights con-
ventions, the ILO has a Committee of Experts that meets to review 
state compliance with various international labor standards. This 
review process has been described as “the most sophisticated super-
visory system in international law.”248  
                                                                                                                  
 245. See Gopalan, supra note 138, at 793-94 (describing the practice of naming and 
shaming). 
 246. As a caveat, I should note that my generalization about NGOs pertains to the 
major organizations that have broad international influence, like Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International. There likely are smaller organizations, typically operating 
within a single country, that rely less on naming and shaming and are able to achieve a 
greater degree of cooperation with state leaders.  
 247. Mission and Objectives, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/mission-and-objectives/lang--en/index.htm (last visited March 12, 2015).    
 248. Lee Swepston, The International Labour Organization’s System of Human Rights 
Protection, in HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT 
91, 95 (Janusz Symonides ed., 2003); see also Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building a Mon-
itoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 519, 556 
(1991) (“ILO mechanisms for collecting information, issuing reports and using publicity as 
a means of encouraging state compliance, are the strongest in the United Nations sys-
tem.”). To be sure, the ILO is not considered to be an unqualified success, and some com-
mentators believe it needs sanctioning powers to achieve results with “recalcitrant states.” 
Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to En-
force Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 361, 382 (1995). Nonethe-
less, relative to other similar organizations, it is difficult to deny that the ILO is a model of 
cooperation. 
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 One unique feature of the ILO review process that likely contrib-
utes to this success is its use of a phased approach. After a state 
submits its report to the Committee of Experts, the Committee fol-
lows up on concerns by sending “direct requests” to governments, 
“requesting further information, or pointing out discrepancies be-
tween a State’s law and practice and the relevant convention.”249 
Such direct requests go straight to governments and are not pub-
lished except for a notation in the report.250 Furthermore, there is a 
common practice to grant a “two-year grace period before the commit-
tee publicizes a failure to implement treaty obligations, to afford time 
for the International Labor Office and the committee itself to work 
with the country to bring it back into compliance.”251 
 After review by the Committee of Experts, the ILO’s Conference 
Committee on Standards selects a set of serious cases for discussion 
at the annual meeting.252 The Conference Committee includes about 
two hundred members divided equally among government, employer, 
and worker representatives.253 Government representatives appear 
before the Conference Committee to explain their reasons for non-
compliance.254 The Conference Committee’s eventual report includes 
a “special list” of states that have failed to meet their obligations; 
these states receive prior warning in the form of “special para-
graph[s]” notifying them that corrective action is warranted.255 
 The ILO system’s two-tiered approach could potentially pay divi-
dends for human rights monitoring bodies by providing them with 
the access they need to diagnose the causes of noncompliance and 
effectively pursue engagement and debiasing strategies. The idea of a 
private initial review stage, combined with a grace period to allow for 
time to address noncompliance, could dramatically alter the relation-
ship between human rights experts and state representatives. The 
present dynamic has been criticized for “often [being] conducive to 
political stands by government representatives.”256 But if the dialogue 
began as a private one, and without the immediate threat of public 
confrontation, the prospects for a constructive, open exchange would 
seem significantly higher. 
                                                                                                                  
 249. Virginia A. Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organ-
isation, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 580, 597 (Philip Alston ed., 1992). 
 250. Id. at 598. 
 251. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 24, at 232. 
 252. Leary, supra note 249, at 598. 
 253. Id. at 599. 
 254. Barratt-Brown, supra note 248, at 558. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Leary, supra note 249, at 597. Although Leary expresses concern about the lack of 
publicity for the Committee of Experts’ work, this tradeoff is less concerning than it might 
otherwise be because the next stage of review is public. See id. at 597-98. 
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 Interestingly, the ILO also retains the option to pursue a coercion 
strategy in the form of reputation sanctions imposed by the Confer-
ence Committee. Given how I have emphasized that only a subset of 
human rights violations result from suboptimal decision-making, 
human rights monitoring bodies should likewise preserve this possi-
bility of altering a state’s expected utility calculation. By clearly sep-
arating the cooperative from the coercive stage, this approach could 
potentially yield the best of both worlds or, at a minimum, reduce the 
distrust that would creep in if coercion were used in a less con-
strained way. 
 2.   International Committee of the Red Cross 
 The ICRC is an independent organization registered as a private 
association under Swiss law.257 Its mission is “to protect the lives and 
dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence 
and to provide them with assistance.”258 While not technically an 
NGO, it serves many of the same functions by promoting the devel-
opment of international humanitarian law, assisting individual vic-
tims, and working with governments to improve compliance.259 Com-
mentators recognize the ICRC as having a uniquely strong reputa-
tion for impartiality that enables it to obtain the cooperation of both 
sides of an armed conflict.260 
 An important factor in the ICRC’s ability to work cooperatively 
with state officials is its promise of confidentiality for detected viola-
tions of international humanitarian law. The process begins when 
ICRC representatives are invited to meet with detainees held by a 
state (or non-state armed group), typically because both sides have 
agreed to such visits.261 After gathering information, the ICRC, ra-
ther than broadcasting violations, communicates directly and confi-
dentially with state and armed-group leaders to identify concerns 
and provide recommended solutions.262 Like the ILO, the ICRC also 
uses a phased approach. If the ICRC determines that its concerns 
                                                                                                                  
 257. Steven R. Ratner, Law Promotion Beyond Law Talk: The Red Cross, Persuasion, 
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have not been adequately addressed, it turns next to seeking assis-
tance from other actors that may have influence on the target state 
or armed group and ultimately to public condemnation.263 
 The lessons of the ICRC example for human rights NGOs essen-
tially parallel those of the ILO example for human rights monitoring 
bodies. In short, the goal would be for human rights NGOs to develop 
the type of trusting relationship with state leaders that would pro-
vide the former with the access they need to diagnose the causes of 
noncompliance and work constructively to overcome suboptimality 
concerns. This could take the form of a phased approach in which any 
coercion strategies are reserved only as a fallback if cooperation fails. 
Alternatively, because there is no reason why any given NGO needs 
to undertake both roles, it may be valuable for some NGOs to special-
ize exclusively in cooperative strategies, which should foster an even 
greater degree of trust than any single NGO adopting a phased ap-
proach could. 
CONCLUSION 
 This Article has attempted to show how at least some human 
rights violations likely result from suboptimal decision-making, and 
it contends that the human rights community should therefore give 
greater attention to the causes of suboptimality in designing strate-
gies to improve compliance. Although efforts to alter a state’s ex-
pected utility calculation through coercion and persuasion remain 
important pieces of the puzzle, this Article highlights the opportuni-
ties available to make more immediate gains. In short, by addressing 
suboptimality concerns directly, the human rights community can 
help clear the way for states to comply with norms when doing so 
would already be the rational choice. 
  
                                                                                                                  
 263. See id. at 470. 
706  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:645 
 
 
